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An Historical
Analysis of the Kentucky
Workmen's Compensation Law'
By HmBERT L. SEGA. L*
In enacting the Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Law in
1916 the General Assembly sought to:
provide an elective system of workmen's compensation
for industrial accidents, prescribing the manner of election
and the rights and liabilities of employers, employes and third
parties; making provision for medical and surgical care of
injured employes; establishing rates of compensation for per-
sonal injuries or death; providing methods of insuring and
securing the payments of such compensation; ... creating a
board to administer this Act, prescribing the duties, powers
and rights thereof and imposing a tax upon insurance pre-
miums, also a tax upon employers who carry their own risk,
for the maintenance of such board and providing a system
of appeal to the courts from the decisions of such board....
As a contemporary commentator remarked:
The passage of a Workmen's Compensation Law by the
1916 General Assembly marks a new epoch in the develop-
ment of the law of this State. It puts Kentucky in the front
* [Ed. Note]. In this article, Mr. Segal traces the statutory history of the
present Workmen's Compensation Act and has cited numerous cases of the Court
of Appeals interpreting the Act. Throughout the article, Mr. Segal's plan is to
set forth the major portions of the Act, section by section, following each section
with his commentary. Asterisks preceding a ICS section indicate that the section
about to be presented deals with a different general area of the law than the
former section. It is hoped that this article will serve as a useful reference to
and source of information regarding problems of statutory interpretation.
** Mr. Segal is a member of the Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Board
and a member of the Labor Committee of the American Bar Association. A
member of the Louisville, Kentucky, and American Bar Associations, Mr. Segal
is a practicing attorney in Louisville, Kentucky, where he specializes in labor-
management relations and labor law.
1 Title-Original Act, see Reynolds Metals Co. v. Glass, 802 Ky. 622, 195
S.W. 2d 280 (1946); Black Mountain Corp. v. Adkins, 280 Ky. 617, 138 S.W. 2d
900 (1939).
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rank of progressive American Commonwealths. This law will
undoubtedly prove to be a most beneficial and praiseworthy
piece of legislation. The cumbersome and often unfair
remedies of the common law are displaced by a system of
rules and remedies which aim to do substantial justice to all
concerned, fairly and impartially.2
The 1916 Act was not the first compensation legislation passed
by the Kentucky General Assembly since the previous Legis-
lature had enacted the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1914.
The 1914 Act, however, was declared unconstitutional, over
strong dissents, on the ground, among other reasons, that it was
a compulsory system violating Section 54 of the Kentucky Con-
stitution.3
Historically workmen's compensation laws had their begin-
ning in the United States approximately fifty years ago. The
Federal Government led the way with the passage of a Com-
pensation Act in 1908 covering civil employees and by 1911 ten
states had adopted such laws.4 Since that time every state and
territory of the United States has adopted such legislation, with
the last state, Mississippi, passing its Act in 1948.5
On June 6, 1916, the Court of Appeals unanimously declared
the 1916 Act constitutional.6
Although the original Act has been amended by numerous
Legislatures since 1916, the basic pattern for compensable re-
covery established at that time has remained substantially un-
changed.
An historical analysis of the key sections of the present Act
will demonstrate this conclusion.
842.003 Definition of "employer" and "hazardous occupations" as
used in KRS 342.016 and 342.017. As used in KRS 342.016 and 342.017:
(1) "Employer" shall mean and include individuals, partnerships,
voluntary associations, and private corporations.
2 Dosker, Workmen's Compensation Law of Kentucky, "Preface to First
Edition," 1916.3 Kentucky State Journal Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Board, 161 Ky.
562, 170 S.W. 1166 (1914); 162 Ky. 387, 172 S.W. 674 (1915).
4 U. S. Dept. of Labor, State Workmens Compensation Laws, Bulletin 161
(1957).
5 U. S. Dept. of Labor, Workmen's Compensation in the United States,
Bulletin 1149 (1954).
6 Greene v. Caldwell, 170 Ky. 571, 186 S.W. 648 (1916).
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(2) "Hazardous occupations" shall mean and include:
(a) All work in and about quarries and mines of all kinds;
(b) All work in the construction and repair of tunnels, subways,
and viaducts;
(c) All work when making, using, or necessitating dangerous
proximity to gunpowder, blasting powder, dynamite, compressed air,
or any other explosive;
(d) The erection or demolition of any bridge, building or struc-
ture;
(e) The operation of all elevators, elevating machines, or derricks,
or hoisting apparatus used within or on the outside of any' bridge,
building or other structure for conveying materials in connection with
the erection or demolition of such bridge, building or structure;
(f) All work on ladders or scaffolds of any kind elevated twenty
feet or more above the ground, water, or floor beneath, in the erec-
tion, construction, repair, painting, or alteration of any building,
bridge, or structure, or other work in which the same are used;
(g) All work of construction, operation, alteration, or repair where
wires, cables, switchboards or other apparatus or machinery are in
use charged with electrical current;
(h) All work in the construction, alteration or repair of pole lines
for telegraph, telephone or other purposes;
(i) All work in mills, shops, works, yards, plants and factories
where steam, electricity or any other mechanical power is used to
operate machinery and appliances in and about such premises;
(j) All other employments not heretofore enumerated carried on
by any employer in which there are engaged or employed three or
more workmen or operatives regularly in the same business or in or
about the same establishment, either upon the premises or at the plant
or away from the plant of the employer, under any contract of hire,
express or implied, oral or written, except farm laborers, domestic
servants, sales people and store clerks, clerks, stenographers, and
professional assistants engaged wholly in office work.
The original Act contained no separate section wherein defi-
nitions were contained as is found in the Act as it reads today.
The present form of this section was enacted by the 1946 As-
sembly.
An attempt in 1946 to again introduce the compulsory feature
for an employer carrying on hazardous occupations was short
lived, when during the same session another amendment was
passed permitting an employer to reject the Act and operate at
1959]
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common law on furnishing financial security. The Court of
Appeals held that the eariler amendment was repealed by
implication.
Rejecting the artificial distinctions of "dual capacity doc-
trine," the Court of Appeals has held that the president of a
corporation is an employee within the meaning of the Act.8
Whether or not an alleged partner is an employee is a ques-
tion of fact; where an alleged partner had no equipment or money
in the business and had signed the compensation register (at the
time signing was required) he was held to be an employee.9
842.004 Liberal construction of chapter. This chapter shall be
liberally construed on questions of law, as distinguished from evi-
dence, and the rule of law requiring strict construction of statutes in
derogation of the common law shall not apply to this chapter.
Prior to 1950 there was no specific provision providing for
liberal construction of the Act. Previously the Court of Appeals
has ruled that "it devolved upon the Workmen's Compensation
Board to construe evidence liberally in favor of claimants in
workmen's compensation cases.10 Although this language was
specifically nullified by the 1950 amendment,1' any doubt as
to the scope of the Act or its application with respect to dis-
abilities or injuries where the facts have been found must be
resolved in favor of the workman or his dependents with all
presumptions being indulged to accomplish that end.'"
342.005 [4880] Employers and employees to whom chapter ap-
plies; voluntary election to come under chapter. (1) This chapter
shall apply to all employers having three or more employes13 regu-
larly engaged in the same occupation or business, and to their em-
7 Sumpter v. Burchett, 304 Ky. 858, 202 S.W. 2d 735 (1947).
8 Mine Service Co. v. Green, 265 S.W. 2d 944 (Ky. 1954).
9 Bartley v. Bartley 280 S.W. 2d 549 (1955), but see Angel v Brown, 313 Ky.
135, 230 S.W. 2d 623 (1950).
10 Yocum Creek Coal Co. v. Jones, 308 Ky. 335, 214 S.W. 2d 410 (1948).
11Wells v. General Electric Co., 318 S.W. 2d 865 (Ky. 1958); Doan v.
Cornett-Lewis Coal Co., 317 S.W. 2d 876 (Ky. 1958).
12 Dick v. International Harvester Co., 310 S.W. 2d 514 (Ky. 1958); Brewer
v. Millich, 276 S.W. 2d 12 (Ky. 1955).
13 For the determining factors involved in the question whether an individual
is an employee or independent contractor, see Mahan v. Litton, 321 S.W. 2d 243
(Ky. 1959); Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Adams, 313 S.W. 2d 421 (Ky. 1958); M. H.
& H. Coal Co. v. Joseph, 310 S.W. 2d 257 (Ky 1958); Hall v. Spurlock, 310
S.W. 2d 259 (Ky. 1958); Cutshin Coal Co. v. Campbell, 309 S.W 2d 39 (K
1958); Partin-Lambdin Lumber Co. v. Frazier, 308 S.W. 2d 792 (Ky. 1958);
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ployes, except that it shall not apply to domestic employment, agri-
culture,.a steam railways, or such common carriers other than steam
railways for which a rule of liability is provided by the laws of the
United States; provided, however, it shall apply to the operators
of threshing machines used in threshing or hulling grain or seeds.
It shall affect the liability of the employers subject thereto to their
employes for a traumatic personal injury sustained by the employe
by accident,14 and for disability resulting from occupational dis-
eases as defined in this chapter, arising out of' 5 and in the course
of'8 his employment, or for death resulting from such accidental17
injury or occupational disease; provided, however, that 'traumatic
personal injury by accident" as herein defined shall not include dis-
eases except where the disease is the natural and direct result of a
traumatic injury by accident nor shall it include the results of a
pre-existing disease, whether previously disabling or not, but shall
include injury or death due to inhalation in mines of noxious gases' 8
or smoke, commonly known as 'bad air,".9 and also shall include
Shephard Elevator Co. v. Thomas, 300 S.W. 2d 782 (Ky. 1957); Sigmond Ikerd
Co. v. Napier, 297 S.W. 2d 917 (Ky. 1957); Hacker v. Hacker, 296 S.W. 2d 713
(Ky. 1956); New Independent Tobacco Warehouse v. Latham, 282 S.W. 2d
846 (Ky. 1955); Bartley v. Bartley, 280 S.W. 2d 549 (Ky. 1955); Sam Home
Motor Co. v. Gregg, 279 S.W. 2d 755 (Ky. 1955); Brewer v. Millich, 276 S.W.
2d 12 (Ky. 1955); Mine Service Co. v1 Green, 265 S.W. 2d 944 (Ky. 1954).
13. Smith v. Supreme Feed Mills, 291 S.W. 2d 830 (Ky. 1956); Ginn v.
Walker, 273 S.W. 2d840 (Ky. 1954); Robinson v. ytle, 276 Ky. 397, 124 S.W.
2d 78 (1939).
14 Karger v. Cissell Mfg. Co., 299 S.W. 2d 788 (Ky. 1957) [circulatory dis-
turbance held not compensable]; Eastern Coal Corp. v. Thacker, 290 S.W. 2d 468
(1956) [mental neurosis]; Ironton Fire Brick Co. v. Madden, 285 S.W. 2d 897
Ky. 1956) [herniated disc]; Adams v. Bryant, 274 S.W. 2d 791 (Ky. 1955)
iheart attack]; Nally, Ballard & Saltsman v. Richards, 248 S.W. 2d 918 (Ky.
1952) [electric shock].
'5 Chesser v. Louisville Country Club, 313 S.W. 2d 410 (Ky. 1958); King
v. Lexington Herald-Leaedr Co., 313 S.W. 2d 423 (Ky. 1958); Ellis v. Litteral,
296 S.W. 2d 883 (Ky. 1954); Tyler-Couch Construction Co. v. Elmore, 264
S.W. 2d 56 (Ky. 1954); Harbison-Walker Refractories Co. v. Brown, 296 Ky.
629, 178 S.W. 2d 39 (1944). For cases concerning the "going to and from work"
rule see King v. Lexington Herald-Leader Co., 313 S.W. 2d 423 (Ky. 1958);
Harian-Wallins Coal Corp. v. Foster, 277 S.W. 2d 14 (Ky. 1955); Harlan-Wallins
Coal Corp. v. Stewart, 275 S.W. 2d 912 (Ky. 1955); N. S. Steel Co. v. Isbell,
275 S.W. 2d 917 (Ky. 1955); Miracle v. Harlan-Wallins Coal Corp., 311 Ky. 169,
223 S.W. 2d 738 (1949).
16 Colwell v. Mosley, 309 S.W. 2d 350 (Ky. 1958); Stapleton v. Fork Junc-
tion Coal Co 247 S.W. 2d 372 (Ky. 1952); Harlan Colieries v. Shell, 239
S.W. 2d 923 (Ky. 1951).
17 Travis Creek Fuel Co. v. Maggard, 293 S.W. 2d 720 (Ky. 1956) [assault];
Hayes Freight Lines v. Burns, 290 S.W. 2d 836 (Ky. 1956) and Tyler-Couch
Construction Co. v. Elmore, 264 S.W. 2d 56 (Ky. 1954) [horseplay]; Henry Vogt
Machine Co. Chamberlain, 279 S.W. 2d 224 (Ky. 1955); York v. City of Hazard,
801 Ky. 306, 191 S.W. 2d 239 (Ky. 1946).
18 Clear Branch Mining Co. v. Holbrook, 247 S.W. 2d 48 (Ky. 1953); Blue
Diamond Coal Co. v. Neace, 303 Ky. 519, 198 S.W. 2d 223 (1946); Black Moun-
tain Corp. v. Williams, 301 Ky. 789, 193 S.W. 2d 416 (1946).
19 Elkhom Coal Corp. v. Maims, 314 Ky. 647, 236 S.W. 2d 910 (1951).
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injuries or death due to the inhalation of any kind of gas, and shall
also include occupational disease as defined in this chapter.
(2) Any employers and employes who are by the provisions of
this section excepted from the provisions of this chapter, including
employers having less than three employes, may subject themselves
thereto by joint voluntary application to the board, in writing, for
such period as may be stated in the application, which shall be
irrevocable during such period and effective thereafter until a writ-
ten revocation be filed with the board or the employment be term-
inated.
The first major change in KRS 42.005 was by the 1918
amendment.20 In that year the requirement of three or more
employees was placed in the Act. By the 1922 amendment the
words "including employers having less than three employees"
were inserted in the second paragraph of this section, after the
word "chapter." In 1924, paragraph (1) of this section was
amended so as to make it apply to "operators of threshing ma-
chines used in threshing or hulling grain or seeds," and by in-
serting the words "but shall include injury or death due to in-
halation of noxious gases or smoke commonly known as 'bad
air,' and also shall include injuries or death due to the inhalation
of any kind of gas.'
The inclusion of recovery in bad air and gases or smoke
cases overruled the Court of Appeals decisions in Jellico Coal
Co. v. Adkins, 197 Ky. 684, 247 S.W. 972 (1923); Elkhorn Coal
Corp. v. Kerr, 203 Ky. 804, 263 S.W. 342 (1924); Midland Coal
Co. v. Rucker's Adm'r., 211 Ky. 582, 277 S.W. 838 (1925).
In 1934 this section had been amended to provide that "em-
ployers and their employees engaged in the operation of glass
manufacturing plants, quarries, sand mines or in the manufac-
turing, treating or handling of sand may, with respect to the
disease of silicosis caused by the inhalation of silica dust,
voluntarily subject themselves thereto as to such disease."
By an amendment in 1944, the 1934 amendment was made
into a separate section (subsection 2) and coverage for sill-
20 All information pertaining to amendments prior to 1926 was secured from
Dosker & Caldwell, Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Law, Annotated (rev. ed.
1927), a brilliant and comprehensive work, without which the early history would
not have been available for discussion here.
21 id. at p. 91.
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cosis by joint vountary application was enlarged to include "any
employers and their employees."21
In 1946 the Assembly attempted to make any employer en-
gaged in a hazardous occupation subject to the Act. This at-
tempt failed when the amendment was held to have been im-
pliedly repealed by a later amendment during the same session
pliedly repealed by a later amendment during the same session.1 b
The 1948 Assembly added in paragraph (1) after the words
"pre-existing disease" the words "whether previously disabling
or not." This amendment apparently was enacted because the
Court of Appeals had held that compensation could be awarded
for disability from a pre-existing disease provided such disease
had lain dormant and had not manifested its active disabling
effects prior to the time of the traumatic injury. 2
The 1956 Assembly added in paragraph (1) the word "trau-
matic" before "personal injury sustained by an employee." Also,
the requirement in paragraph (2) for election for coverage
with respect to the disease of silicosis was eliminated.
In this section, as well as throughout the Act, the words
"occupational disease" were added to conform with the Occu-
pational Disease Act as passed by the 1956 General Assembly, as
will be more specifically discussed under KRS 842.316.
The Court of Appeals has not ruled on the effect, if any, of
the insertion of the word "traumatic" in this section (and in
other sections). It has been and will no doubt be argued that the
inclusion of the word "traumatic" overrules decisions allowing
compensation for heart attacks28 and heat exhaustion.
24
The Workmen's Compensation Act, though elective, is im-
potent to take jurisdiction from "admiralty" and to confer upon
the Board and state courts jurisdiction because of the "mari-
time clause."25
-1a Inland Steel Co. v. Byrd, 316 S.W. 2d 215 (Ky. 1958).
2b Sumpter v. Burchett, 202 S.W. 2d 735 (Ky. 1947).
22 Wood-Mosaic Co. v. Shumate, 305 Ky. 368, 204 S.W. 2d 331 (1947).
Also see Belcher v. Cornman's Adm'x., et. al., 265 S.W. 2d 492 (Ky. 1954) and
Highland Co., Inc. v. Goben, 295 Ky. 803, 175 S.W. 2d 124 (1943).23 Salmon v. Armco Steel Corp., 275 S.W. 2d 590 (Ky. 1955); Adams v.
Bryant, 274 S.W. 2d 798 (Ky. 1955); Hoosier Engineering Co. v. Sparks, 302
Ky. 375, 194 S.W. 2d 843 (1946).
24 Central Lumber Co. v. Wood, 284 S.W. 2d 688 (Ky. 1955), but see Mellon
v. Ashland Coca Cola Bottling Co., 302 Ky. 176, 194 S.W. 2d 171 (1946).
25 Lee v. Licking Valley Coal Digger Co., 209 Ky. 780, 273 S.W. 2d 542
(1925).
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Jurisdiction cannot be waived but the employer may be
estopped from pleading lack of jurisdiction.2 6
842.010 [4881] "Employe" to include municipal corporations and
state. "Employer" as used in this chapter includes municipal cor-
porations and any subdivision or corporation thereof. Any election
with reference to this chapter shall be exercised by the law-making
or other governing body thereof. "Employer" as used in this chapter
also includes all departments, boards, commissions, and all superin-
tendents or receivers of penal or eleemosynary institutions managed
or directed by the Department of Welfare or any other department
or agency of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Any election with
reference to this chapter shall be exercised by the Commissioner of
Finance. Nothing contained in this chapter shall amend, repeal or
interfere with any statute or ordinance relating to associations or
funds for the relief, pensioning, retirement or other benefit of any
employe of such municipal employer, or any of the employes of any
state department, or the widows, children or dependents of such
employes.
Prior to the 1926 amendment counties were not subject to
Workmen's Compensation Act.27 By the amendment of 1926,
the term "employer" was made to include all departments in the
State Government. By the amendment of 1956 the term "em-
ployer" was re-defined to include "all departments, boards,
commissions, and all superintendents or receivers of penal or
eleemosynary institutions managed or directed by the Depart-
ment of Welfare or any other department or agency of the Com-
monwealth of Kentucky." Also included in the 1956 amend-
ments was the provision that "Any election . . . shall be exer-
cised by the Commissioner of Finance."
842.015 [4882] Acceptance of chapter relieves of other liability;
exceptions; willful misconduct. (1) Where at the time of the injury
both employer and employe have elected to furnish or accept com-
pensation under the provisions of this chapter for a traumatic per-
sonal injury, received by an employe by accident and arising out of
26Carps Fork Coal Co. v. Yancey, 297 S.W. 2d 914 (Ky. 1957); Smith v.
Supreme Feed Mills, 291 S.W. 2d 830 (Ky. 1956); Eastern Coal Corp. v. Morris,
287 S.W. 2d 603 (Ky. 1956); Ginn v. Walker, 273 S.W. 2d 840 (Ky. 1954).
?7 Forsythe v. Pendleton County, 205 Ky. 770, 266 S.W. 639 (1924).
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such injury, within two years thereafter, or for disability or death
resulting from occupational disease as defined in this chapter, the
employer shall be liable to provide and pay compensation under the
provisions of this chapter and shall, except as provided in subsection
(2) of this section and in KRS 842.170, be released from all other
liability.
2 7a
(2) If injury or death results to an employe through the delib-
erate intention28 of his employer to produce such injury or death,
the employe or his dependent as herein defined shall receive the
amount provided in this chapter in a lump sum to be used, if desired,
to prosecute the employer. The dependents may bring suit again
the employer for any amount they desire. If injury or death results
to an employe through the deliberate intention of his employer to
produce such injury or death, the employe or his dependents may
take under this chapter, or in lieu thereof, have a cause of action
at law against the employer as if this chapter, had not been passed,
for such damage so sustained by the employe, his dependents or per-
sonal representatives as is recoverable at law. If a suit is brought
under this section, all right to compensation under this chapter
shall thereby be waived as to all persons. If a claim is made for the
payment of compensation or any other benefit provided by this
chapter, all rights to sue the employer for damages on account of
such injury or death shall be waived as to all persons.
(8) No employe or dependent of any employe may receive com-
pensation on account of any injury to or death of an employe caused
by a willful self-inflicted injury, wilful misconduct or intoxication
of such employe.
(4) "Willful misconduct" as used in this section, when relating
to occupational disease, shall include:
(a) Failure or omission on the part of an employe to observe
rules and recommendations adopted by the employer and approved
by the Workmen's Compensation Board and kept posted in a con-
spicuous place in and about the plant;
(b) Failure or omission on the part of an employe truthfully to
state to the best of his knowledge in answer to inquiry made by the
employer, the place, duration, and nature of previous employment;
(c) Failure and omission on the part of an employe truthfully
to furnish to the best of his knowledge in answer to an inquiry made
by the employer full information about the previous status of his
and in the course of his employment, or for death resulting from
27a Mahan v. Litton, 321 S.W. 2d 248 (Ky. 1959); Commonwealth of Ken-
tucky v. Meyers, 807 S.W. 2d 179 (Ky. 1957).28 Fryman v. Electric Steam Radiator Corp., 277 S.W. 2d 25 (1955).
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health, habits, and medical attention that he or his blood relatives
may have received;
(d) Failure to submit to medical examination to determine his
physical condition with reference to occupational diseases when
ordered by the board, or evasion or obstruction of such examination.
This section is substantially the same as enacted in the or-
iginal Act of 1916 but the above paragraph (1) providing for
payment of compensation under the provisions of the chapter
and the releasing of the employer from all other liability was
subsequently further limited by KRS 342.170 (minors illegally
employed). Further, "willfull misconduct" was by subsequent
amendment defined as set out in the present paragraphs 4(a),
(b), (c) and'(d). Changes in KRS 342.015(1) are the inclu-
sion of the word "traumatic" and the substitution of "occupa-
tional disease" for "silicosis."
The acceptance of the Act by the employer and the employee
controls the rights of the parties and is a contract between them
for payment of compensation for injuries in accordance with the
Act in effect at the time the injury occurred29 and acceptance
of the Act releases the employer from all common law liability,30
except for violations of KRS 342.015(2).
As stated supra where the Legislature at one session first
amended the Act thereby compelling employers engaged in haz-
ardous operations to accept and operate under the Act, and dur-
ing the same session further amended the Act to permit em-
ployers to reject the Compensation Act and operate under the
common law if security were furnished to protect judgments, the
first amendment was repealed by implication."
842.016 Bond, security or insurance policy to be filed by employer
in hazardous occupation who does not elect to operate under chapter;
conditions; penal sum; renewal. (1) Every employer now or here-
after doing business in this Commonwealth who regularly employs
three or more persons in a hazardous occupation and who is not
excepted from the application -of the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act but fails to elect to operate thereunder, or having
29Thomas v. Crummies Creek Coal Co., 297 Ky. 210, 179 S.W. 2d 882
(1944).
90 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Broughton, 195 F. 2d 95 (1952); Comm. of Ky. v.
Meyers, 807 S.W. 2d 179 (Ky. 1957).
33 Sumpter v. Burchett, 804 Ky. 858, 202 S.W. 2d 785 (1947).
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so elected withdraws such election, shall file with the Commissioner
of Industrial Relations, within thirty days after June 19, 1946, or such
employment is begun, or such previous election is withdrawn, a good
and sufficient security, indemnity bond or insurance policy issued
by a surety or insurance company or other insurance carrier author-
ized to transact such business in this state, which shall insure the
payment of any final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction
obtained against such an employer by an employe or his personal
representative for damages resulting from injuries to the person or
death of such employe, by accident arising out of and in the course
of his employment. The bond or policy shall contain such terms
and shall be in such penal sum or maximum amount as the Com-
missioner of Industrial Relations shall deem necessary, taking into
consideration the solvency of the employer, the number of employes
and the hazard of the employment in which they are engaged, for
the reasonable protection of such judgment creditors in the collec-
tion of the amounts adjudged to be due them.
(2) It shall be a condition of such security, indemnity bond or
insurance policy that the obligor will promptly pay such judgments
to the persons entitled thereto. Such security, indemnity bond and
insurance policy shall be renewed annually or when the first and
succeeding bonds or policies expire or are terminated, or when the
protection afforded by the bonds or security has been so diminished
by reason of judgments covered thereby so as to render the same
inadequate.
342.017 Hearing concerning giving of bond or security, and amount
and terms thereof; appeal. (1) The amount and terms of such security
or bond shall be determined by the commissioner upon reasonable
notice and opportunity for hearing. Any person, firm or corporation
affected by such security or bond may, within forty days after a
final order or determination by the commissioner requiring or fixing
such security or bond, or refusing to require same, bring an action
in the Franklin Circuit Court to modify or set aside such order or
determination of the commissioner.
(2) The court shall hear the cause and enter judgment affirming,
modifying or setting aside the order or determination of the com-
missioner, or may, in its discretion, in advance of judgment, remand
the cause to the commissioner for finther proceedings consistent with
the direction of the court.
(3) Either party to the action may, within forty days after the
entry of a final judgment by the circuit court, appeal to the Court
of Appeals, and the appeal, when fied in the office of the Clerk of
1959]
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the Court of Appeals, shall be docketed and advanced in the same
manner as in Commonwealth cases.
KRS 342.016 and KRS 342.017 were originally enacted by
the 1946 Legislature and have remained unchanged to date.
An employer willfully violating these sections "shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined not less
than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars,"
and each day's wrongful violation "shall constitute a separate
offense."8 2
842.020 [4883] Medical treatment at expense of employer; arti-
ficial members and braces. (1) In addition to all other compensa-
tion provided in this chapter, the employer shall furnish for the cure
and relief from the effects of an injury or occupational disease, such
medical, surgical and hospital treatment, including nursing, medical
and surgical supplies and appliances, as may reasonably be required
at the time of the injury and thereafter during disability, or as may
be required for the cure and treatment of an occupational disease,
but not exceeding a total expense to the employer of more than
twenty-five hundred dollars. If the employer fails to furnish such
treatment reasonably, he shall be liable for the reasonable expense,
within the limits of this section, incurred by or on behalf of the em-
ploye in providing such treatments. In an emergency, the employe
may call in any available physician or surgeon to administer any
first aid reasonably necessary at the expense of the employer within
the limits of this section. The board, in its discretion, may apportion
payments to be made under this section between hospitals and physi-
cians in cases where their aggregate fees and charges would exceed
the maximum for which the employer is liable.
(2) Where a compensable injury or occupational disease results
in the amputation of an arm, hand, leg or foot, or the loss of hear-
ing, or the enucleation of an eye or the loss of natural teeth, the em-
ployer shall initially furnish in addition to other medical, surgical
and hospital treatment enumerated in subsection (1) of this section,
a modem artificial member, and where required, proper braces but
the employer's liability for such artificial member or braces shall not,
including his liability for medical, surgical and hospital treatment
exceed twenty-five hundred dollars.
The 1920 Amendment empowered the Board, by order made
within ninety days after the injury, to extend the period of
82 KRS 342.990(8).
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treatment beyond ninety days or increase the limit of expense
but not to exceed $200.00. This section remained substantially
unchanged, except for amendments increasing the amounts of
medical benefits, until 1946. In 1946 the employer was made
responsible for medical payments "during disability, not exceed-
ing a total expense to the employer of more than $400.00," with
the ninety day cutoffs being eliminated.
By amendment in 1948 this amount was raised to $500.00
and the following clause added in the first paragraph:
The Board may, by order made upon application within
a period of six months from date of the accident, extend
the limit of expense to not exceeding a total of eight
hundred dollars.
Further, in 1948 a new paragraph was added:
(2) Where a compensable injury results in the amputa-
tion of an arm, hand, leg or foot, or the loss of hearing,
or the enucleation of an eye or the loss of natural teeth,
the employer shall initially famish in addition to the med-
ical, surgical, and hospital treatment enumerated in sub-
section (1) of this section a modem artificial member,
and where required, proper braces.
The 1950 Assembly removed the six months provision and
raised the amount of medical expenses for which the employer
may be liable to $2,500.00, which amount has remained un-
changed to date. Further, paragraph (2) which was added by
the 1948 Legislature was removed.
In 1952 paragraph (2) of the 1948 amendment was re-enacted
and has remained in the Act with this additional language:
but the employer's liability for such artificial' member or
braces shall not, including his liability for medical, sur-
gival and hospital treatment exceed twenty-five hundred
dollars.
The only change made by the 1956 Assembly was to include
medical payments for occupational diseases.
The present Act does not contain a rehabilitation section.
Since the Act provides "the employer shall furnish for the care
and relief from the effects of an injury or occupational disease,
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etc.", it might be argued that the word "relief' includes rehabili-
tation.
It is generally felt that the next major change in the Act
will be an amendment to provide a full and complete rehabili-
tation program for occupationally injured employees.
The payment of medical expenses under this section, in addi-
tion to all other compensation, is mandatory;33 however, it is not
necessary to show that the medical bills had been tendered or
paid by the employee.34
If an employer voluntarily pays more than the amount of
his statutory liability under this section, he is not entitled to
credit against compensation awarded employee in the absence
of agreement with the employee."
342.021 Employees duty to furnish copies of examination or treat-
ment report; employe's duty if doctor chosen by him. (1) Whenever
an employe receives a personal injury which is or may be compen-
sated under the Workmen's Compensation Law and said employe
is examined or treated for such injury by a doctor or physician under
the provisions of KRS 342.020 the employer shall cause to be furn-
ished to the employe, if requested by him, and to the board, if re-
quired by it, immediately following said examination or treatment
a copy of the report of the doctor or physician showing the nature
and condition and effect of the employe's injury. Upon any future
examination or examinations by a doctor or physician the employer
shall cause to be furnished to the employe, if requested by him,
and to the board, if required by it, immediately followving such
examination copies of the reports thereof containing the information
mentioned above.
(2) If the employe should be examined or treated by any doctor
of his own choosing the employe shall, immediately following said
examination, cause a copy of the report thereof to be furnished to his
employer or to the board, if required by either.
This section was originally enacted in 1952 and has remained
unchanged to date.
33 Black Mountain Corp. v. Stewart, 272 Ky. 140, 113 S.W. 2d 1141 (1938).
34 Black Mountain Corp. v. Seward, 275 Ky. 177, 121 S.W. 2d 4 (1938).
35 Harlan Collieries Co. v. Johnson, 308 Ky. 89, 212 S.W. 2d 540 (1948);
Blue Grass Mining Co. v. Stamper, 267 Ky. 643, 103 S.W. 2d 112 (1937). ,
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842.025 [4884] Hernia. (1) In all claims for hernia resulting
from injury received in the course of and resulting from the em-
ploye's employment it must be definitely proved to the satisfaction
of the board that:
(a) There was an injury resulting in hernia;
(b) The hernia appeared suddenly and immediately following
the injury; and
(c) The hernia did not exist in any degree, including the primary
or incomplete stage, prior to the injury for which compensation is
claimed.3
5a
(2) In all such cases where liability for compensation exists, the
employer shall, within the limits of KRS 342.020, provide competent
surgical treatment by radical operatoin. In case the injured employe
refuses to submit to the operation, the employer may require a med-
ical examiantion as provided in KRS 342.205.
(3) If it is shown by such examination that the employe has
any chronic disease or is otherwise in such physical condition so as
to render it more than ordinarily unsafe to submit to such operation,
he shall, if unwilling to submit to the operation, be entitled to com-
pensation for disability under the general provisions of this chapter.
If the examination does not disclose the existence of disease or other
physical condition rendering the operation more than ordinarily un-
safe, and the employe, with the knowledge of the result of such
examination, thereafter refuses to submit to such operation, he shall
be entitled to compensation for disability under the general provi-
sions of this chapter for not exceeding one year. If the employe
submits to the operation he shall, in addition to the surgical benefits
herein provided for, be entitled to compensation for his actual dis-
ability following such operation. If the hernia results in death within
one year after it is sustained, or the operation results in death, such
death shall be deemed a result of the injury causing such hernia
and compensated accordingly under the provisions of this chapter.
This subsection shall not apply where the employe has refused to
submit to an operation which has been found by the examination herein
provided for not to be more than ordinarily unsafe.
Prior to 1948 this section remained substantially unchanged
from the original Act of 1916 except in 1924 when it was amended
so that an employee who submits to the operation set out above
35a Jenkins v. Tube Turns, 320 S.W. 2d 48 (Ky. 1959).
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is entitled to compensation for his actual disability following
such operation rather than compensation for 26 weeks only36
In 1948 the words "including the primary or incomplete
stage" were added in subsection (1) (c) after the word "de-
gree" so that the section read:
(c) The hernia did not exist in any degree, including the
primary or incomplete stage, prior to the injury for which
compensation is claimed.
Mere predisposition to the development of a hernia would
not render an injury from hernia noncompensable where, but
for the mishap, there would have been no protrusion and sub-
sequent disability.37
An employer could not, three years after an employee sus-
tained an injury resulting in hernia, require the employee to
submit to an operation as a condition of receiving compensation.38
Delay in giving notice occasioned by mistake or other reason-
able cause is not fatal to recovery.
3 9
842.080 [48851 Improper physician or treatment. (1) If it is shown
that the employer is furnishing the requirements provided by KRS
42.020 in such manner that there is reasonable ground for believing
that the life, health or recovery of the employe is being endangered
or impaired thereby, the board may order a change in the physician
or other requirement. If the employer fails promptly to comply with
such order after receiving it, the board may permit the employe or
some one for him to provide the same at the expense of the employer
under such reasonable regulations as may be provided by the board.
(2) No action shall be brought against any employer subject to
this chapter by any person to recover damages for malpractice or im-
proper treatment received by any employe from any physician, hos-
pital or attendant thereof.
This section was part of the original Act of 1916 and has
remained unchanged to date. An employer is not liable at law
36 Dosker, op. cit. supra note 20 at 271.37 Mullins v. Ky.-W. Va. Gas Co., 300 S.W. 2d 553 (Ky. 1957).
38 Mullins v. Ky.-W. Va. Gas Co., 307 S.W. 2d 169 (Ky. 1957); Larson v.
Harlan Wallins Coal Corp., 253 S.W. 2d 860 (Ky. 1953).39 Mengel Co. v. Axley, 224 S.W. 2d 923 (Ky. 1949).
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for damages for malpractice or improper treatment.4 0 However, if
an employer helps select the hospital and surgeon, and the em-
ployee's death is caused by an alleged slip of the surgeon's knife
during an operation to remedy a condition incurred by compen-
sable accident, death of the employee is compensable.
4 1
842.035 [4886] Medical fees to be reasonable; failure to follow
advice. (1) All fees and charges under KRS 42.020 and 342.030
shall be fair and reasonable, shall be subject to regulation by the
board and shall be limited to such charges as are reasonable for similar
treatment of injured persons of a like standard of living in the same
community and where such treatment is paid for by the injured per-
son himself. In determining what fees are reasonable, the board may
also consider the increased security of payment afforded by this
chapter.
(2) Where such requirements are furnished by a public hospital
or other institution, payment thereof shall be made to the proper
authorities conducting it. No compensation shall be payable for the
death or disability of an employe if his death is caused, or if and in
so far as his disability is aggravated, caused or continued, by an
unreasonable failure to submit to or follow any competent surgical
treatment or medical aid or advice.
This section has remained substantially unchanged since the
original Act of 1916.
Whether or not an injured employee's refusal to undergo op-
eration is unreasonable is a question of fact.4 An injured em-
ployee is under no duty to submit to an amputation, 3 nor will
the courts require a patient to follow the findings of one doctor
in preference to another,44 or require a litigant to twice risk
his life in order to provide an opportunity to reduce liability.4 5
For the test as to what is an unreasonable refusal see Mullins v.
Ky.-W. Va. Gas Co., 307 S.W. 2d 169 (Ky. 1957); United Electric
Coal Co. v. Adams, 299 S.W. 2d 246 (Ky. 1956); Melcher v.
Drummond Mfg. Co., 229 S.W. 2d 52 (Ky. 1950); l3lack Star
Coal Co. v. Sergener, 297 Ky. 633, 181 S.W. 2d 53 (1944).
40 Black Mountain Corp. v. Middleton, 248 Ky. 527, 49 S.W. 2d 818 (1982),
but see Powers v. Middlesboro Hospital, 258 Ky. 20, 79 S.W. 2d 891 (1985).
41 McCorkle v. McCorkle, 265 S.W. 2d 779 (Ky. 1954).
42 Fordson Coal Co. v. Palko, 282 Ky. 897, 188 S.W. 2d 456 (1940).4
3 Ky.-Jellico Coal Co. v. Lee, 289 Ky. 821, 158 S.W. 2d 885 (1942).
44 Schaab v. Irwin, 298 Ky. 626, 183 S.W. 2d 814 (1944).
45 Id. at 815.
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842.040 [4887] Time of payment of compensation. Except as pro-
vided in KRS 342.020 and 42.030 no compensation shall be payable
for the first seven days of disability unless disability continues for a
period of more than two weeks in which case compensation shall
be allowed from the first day of disability. All compensation shall
be payable on the regular pay day of the employer, commencing
with the first regular pay day after seven days after the injury or
disability resulting from an occupational disease, with interest, at
the rate of six per cent per annum on each installment from the time
it is due until paid.46
The original Act of 1916 provided that compensation shall
not be payable for the first two weeks from the date of injury. By
the 1918 amendment the waiting period was reduced to seven
days. A subsequent amendment which remained in effect until
1948 provided that no compensation shall be payable for the
first seven days of disability unless disability continued for a
period of more than four weeks, in which case the compensation
was made retroactive to the first day of disability. By the 1948
amendment the period of duration of disability before retroactive
payment from the first day of injury was reduced from four
weeks to three weeks. In 1956 this period was further reduced to
two weeks.
The rate of interest for due but unpaid payments was set
at 6% per annun in the original Act and has remained un-
changed to date. Where a bona fide tender of compensation is
made and is continued, liability for interest on the award stops.47
842.045 [4888] Injury out of state to person employed here. Any
employer who hires employes within this state to work in whole or in
part without this state, may agree in writing with such employes to
exempt from the operation of this chapter injuries received outside
of this state. In the absence of such an agreement, the remedies
provided by this chapter shall be exclusive as regards injuries re-
ceived outside this state and shall be upon the same terms and con-
ditions as if the injuries were received within this state.48
46 Schaab v. Irwin, 298 Ky. 626, 183 S.W. 2d 814 (-944); Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Reeves, 254 Ky. 83, 70 S.W. 2d 992 (1934).
47 Pfoff v. Osborne, 269 S.W. 2d 710 (Ky. 1954).
48 Sloan v. Appalachian Mountain Electric Co., 27 F. Supp. 118 (1939).
[Vol. 47,
KENT9rucKoy WORKiMEN'S CO-MPENSATON LAW
This section has remained unchanged since the original Act
of 1916.
Where a Kentucky resident and Ohio employer entered into
an employment contract in Ohio providing for labor to be per-
formed in Kentucky and provided that employee's exclusive
remedy was to be under Ohio Compensation Act, public policy
of Kentucky did not preclude contract being given effect so as
to bar suit at common law in Kenitucky.49
242.050 [4889] No employer to be relieved of obligation of this
chapter. Except as provided in this chapter, no contract or agree-
ment, written or implied, no rule, regulation or other device, shall
in any manner operate to relieve any employer in whole or in part
of any obligation created by this chapter.50
This section has remained unchanged since the original Act
of 1916.
Where there was an agreement to pay lump sum compensation
and the case was dismissed as settled, the agreement was held void
under this section because not approved by the Board as other-
wise provided in the Act.51
842.055 [4890] Remedies when third party is legally liable. When-
ever an injury for which compensation is payable under this chapter
has been sustained under circumstances creating in some other per-
son than the employer a legal liability to pay damages, the injured
employe may either claim compensation or proceed at law by civil
action against such other person to recover damages, or proceed both
against the employer for compensation and such other person to re-
cover damages, but he shall not collect from both. If the injured
employe elects to proceed at law by civil action against such other
person to recover damages, he shall give due and timely notice to
the employer of the filing of such action. If compensation is awarded
under this chapter, either the employer or his insurance carrier, hav-
ing paid the compensation or having become liable therefor, may re-
cover in his or its own name or that of the injured employe from
49 Buckman v. Republic Structural Painting Corp., 302 S.W. 2d 855 (Ky.
1957).5 0 Buckman v. Republic Structural Painting Corp., 302 S.W. 2d 855 (Ky.
1957); Brewer v. Milch, 276 S.W. 2d 12 (Ky. 1955); Morrison v. C. & C. Chem-
icals Corp., 278 Ky. 746, 129 S.W. 2d 547 (1939).5 1 Stewart v. Model Coal Co., 216 Ky. 742, 288 S.W. 696 (1926).
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the other person in whom legal liability for damages exists, not to
exceed the indemnity paid and payable to the injured employe.5
2
This section has remained substantially the same as set out
in the original Act except for the addition in 1922 of the words
"or his insurance carrier" after the word "employer" in the last
sentence,53 and, in 1948 the addition of the following clause
which completes the section as it now exists:
If the injured employee elects to proceed at law by civil
action against such other person to recover damages, he
shall give due and timely notice to the employer of the
ling of such action.
For a thorough discussion of credits to be allowed in relation
to attorney's fees, medical and hospital expenses see Southern
Quarries & Contracting Co. v. Hensley, 232 S.W. 2d 999 (1950).
842.060 [48911 Liability of contractor and subcontractor. A prin-
cipal contractor, intermediate or subcontractor shall be liable for com-
pensation 54 to any employe injured while in the employ of any one
of his intermediate or subcontractors and engaged upon the subject
matter of the contract, to the same extent as the immediate em-
ployer. Any principal, intermediate or subcontractor who pays such
compensation may recover the amount paid from any subordinate
contractor through whom he has been rendered liable under this
section. Every claim to compensation under this section shall in the
first instance be presented to and instituted against the immediate
employer, but such proceedings shall not constitute a waiver of the
employe's rights to recover compensation under this chapter from
the principal or intermediate contractor. The collection of full com-
pensation from one employer shall bar recovery by the employe
against any other. But he shall not collect from all a total compensa-
tion in excess of the amount for which his immediate employer is
liable. This section shall apply only in cases where the injury oc-
curred on, in or about the premises on which the principal contractor
has undertaken to execute work or which are under his control
otherwise or management.
This section has remained substantially unchanged since the
52 Bumpus v. Drinkard's Adm'x., 279 S.W. 2d 4 (Ky. 1955); Roberts v. U. S.
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 273 S.W. 2d 39 (Ky. 1954).5 3 Dosker, Workmen's Compensation Law in Kentucky 299 (1st ed. 1916).5 4 Statton V. Reynolds Metals Co., 58 F. Supp. 657.
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original Act except the words "or subcontractor" and "or their
insurance carrier" were added by a 1922 amendment. 5
In 1924 the words "or other insurance carrier" were deleted
from the Act, as was a comma on the first line of the section
after the word "principal."56
For definitions of independent contractor as contrasted with
subcontractor see Ruth Bros v. Roberts, 270 Ky. 839, 109 S.W.
2d 800 (1937).
342.065 [4892] Certain minors considered sui Juris. A minor six-
teen years of age or over or a minor under sixteen years of age who
has procured his employment upon the written certification of his
parent, guardian or one having legal authority over him that he is
over sixteen years of age57 shall be considered sui juris5 s for the pur-
poses of this chapter, and no other person shall have cause of action
or right to compensation for his injury or death for loss of service
on account thereof, by reason of the minority of such employe. If
a lump sum of compensation is made to such minor employe, pay-
ment shall be made to his guardian. Such certificate shall be in
form as follows: "To (name of employer); This is to certify that
(name of minor employe), of whom the undersigned is the ..........
is over the age of sixteen years. Signed this ...... day of .......
Identification of such signature of the parent, guardian or person
having legal authority over such minor employe shall constitute con-
clusive proof of such procurement of his employment in any hear-
ing or proceeding in which it is material or in issue.
This section as it now reads has remained substantially un-
changed since the amendments of 1924.
There must be willful and known violation of the child labor
laws before the employer is subject to common law actions for
damages.5 9
342.070 [4893; 4896] Compensation in case of death. If death
should result within two years from an accident for which compen-
sation is payable under this chapter, or from an occupational disease,
the employer or his insurer shall pay to the person entitled to com-
55 Dosker, op cit supra note 58 at 804.
56 Ibid.
57Riddells Admnr. v. Berry, 298 S.W. 2d 1 (Ky. 1956).
58 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Broughton, 195 F. 2d 95.
59 Caldwell v. Jarvis, 299 Ky. 489, 185 S.W. 2d 552 (1945) [overruling
Wynn Coal Co. v. Lindsey, 230 Ky. 43, 18 S.'W. 2d 864 (1929)].
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pensation, or, if none, then to the personal representative of the de-
ceased employe, reasonable burial expenses of a person of the stand-
ard of living of the deceased, not to exceed the sum of three hun-
dred dollars, and shall also pay to or for the following persons com-
pensation as follows:
(1) If there are one or more wholly dependent persons, sixty-five
per cent of the average weekly earnings of the deceased employe, but
not to exceed thirty dollars nor less than twelve dollars per week shall
be payable, all such payments to be made for the period between
the date of death and four hundred weeks after the date of accident
to the employe or after the date his disability from an occupational
disease began, or until the intervening termination of dependency,
but in no case to exceed the maximum sum of twelve thousand dollars.
(2) (a) If there are partly dependent persons, the payments
shall be such part of what would be payable for total dependency
as the partial dependency existing at the time of the accident or
after the date his disability from an occupational disease began to
the employe is proportionate to total dependency, and all such
payments to be made for the period between the date of death and
four hundred weeks after the date of the accident to the deceased
employe, or after the date his disability from an occupational disease
began, or until the intervening termination of dependency, but in
no case to exceed in the aggregate of compensation on account of
such death the maximum sum of twelve thousand dollars.
(b) Partial dependency shall be determined by the proportion
of the earnings of the employe which have been contributed to such
partial dependent during one year next preceding the date of in-
jury or after the date his disability from an occupational disease
began; if the relation of partial dependency did not exist for one
year next preceding the date of injury, the board shall consider all
the facts and circumstances and fix such proportion as is fair and
reasonable thereunder.
(3) All relations of dependency referred to in this section shall
mean dependency existing at the time of the accident to the employe
or at the time his disability from an occupational disease began.
(4) If death occurs as a result of the injury or an occupational dis-
ease after a period of total or partial disability, the period of dis-
ability shall be deducted from the total period of compensation and
the benefits paid thereunder from the maximum allowed for death
by this section.
Except for subsection (4) and the mandatory amounts pay-
able, this section has remained substantially unchanged since
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its enactment in 1916. The original Act provided for a sum not
to exceed $75.00 for funeral expenses and maximum death bene-
fits of $4,000.00. By 1946 the total amount for death benefits
was increased to $6,000.00. The 1948 Assembly increased the
amount allowable for funeral expenses to $300.00 and the amount
payable to the personal representative, if there were no de-
pendents, to $200.00, and death benefits to $8,000.00. The 1950,
1952 and 1956 Assemblies raised the death benefits to $8,500.00,
$9,500.00 and $12,000.00 respectively, with the 1956 amend-
ment further conforming this section to include recovery for
occupational disease and eliminating the provision for payment
of the sum of $200.00 to personal representatives of the deceased
employee if there are no dependents.
The burden is on claimant to establish that deceased em-
ployee's injury was the primary cause of death,60 but where death
follows soon after injury to an able-bodied man a presumption
arises that death was caused by the injury in the absence of other
conjectural testimony to the contrary. °a
Relation of dependency is a question of fact and is determined
as of the time of the accident.6
A dependent does not lose his status of total dependency
merely because he sporadically earns small amounts of money.
62
342.075 [4894] Determination of dependency. (1) The following
persons shall be presumed to be wholly dependent upon a deceased
employe:
(a) A wife upon a husband whom she had not voluntarily aband-
oned at the time of the accident, or who having been abandoned by
her husband has not engaged in such conduct since his abandon-
ment as would at common law constitute grounds justifying the
abandonment of such wife by her husband;
63
(b) A husband incapacitated from wage-earning, upon a wife-
whom he has not voluntarily abandoned at the time of the accident
to the wife; and
60 Ratliff v. Cubbage, 314 Ky. 716, 236 S.W. 2d 944 (1951); January-Wood
Co. v. Brambel, 252 Ky. 258, 67 S.W. 2d 14 (1934).
60a Blue Bird Mining Co. v. Kelly, 237 S.W. 2d 530 (Ky. 1951); Ellis
v. Litteral 296 Ky. 287, 176 S.W. 2d 883 (1944).
61 Miller v. Elkhorn Coal Corp., 284 Ky. 737, 145 S.W. 2d 822 (1940).
62 Schaab v. Townsend, 302 Ky. 121, 190 S.W. 2d 1014 (1945).
6Cmsv. Elkhorn Coal Corp., 281 S.W. 2d 424 (Ky. 1955); also see
R~itchey v. Katy Coal Co., 313 Ky. 310, 231 S.W. 2d 57 (1950); Blue Diamond
Coal Co. v. Hensley, 314 Ky. 85, 234 S.W. 2d 317 (1950).
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(c) A child or children under the age of sixteen years, or over
sixteen years if incapacitated from wage-earning, upon the parent
with whom such child or children are living, or by whom actually
supported, or from whom support is legally required by judgment
of a court, at the time of the accident.
(2) In all other cases the relation of dependency in whole or
in part shall be determined in accordance with the facts of each case
existing at the time of the accident.61a
(8) No person shall be considered a dependent in any degree
unless he is living in the household of the employe at the time of
the accident, or unless such person bears to the employe the rela-
tion of father, mother, husband or wife, father-in-law or mother-in-
law, grandfather or grandmother, child, or grandchild, or brother
or sister of the whole or half blood.
This section has remained substantially unchanged from the
original Act except for the following:
or who having been abandoned by her husband has not
engaged in such conduct since his abandonment as would
at common law constitute grounds justifying the abandon-
ment of such wife by her husband;
which was added by the 1950 Assembly to 1(a).
The 1952 Legislature added to subsection 1(c) "or from
whom support is legally required by judgment of a court." It
is interesting to note that the 1952 amendment restored what
had been provided in the 1916 Act and for some unknown reason
had been deleted by subsequent amendment.
The question of dependency or the degree of dependency is
one of fact to be determined by the Board, and its findings are
conclusive when supported by evidence having probative value. 4
842.080 [4894] When compensation ceases. Compensation to any
dependent shall cease at the death 5 or legal or common-law mar-
riage66 of such dependent or, in the case of a child or children, upon
attaining the age of twenty years unless incapacitated from wage
earning. Upon the cessation of compensation to or on account of
any person the compensation of the remaining persons entitled to
63a Vogt & Conant Co. v. Boelhauf, 317 S.W. 2d 163 (Ky. 1958).
64 Young v. Waters Construction Co., 281 S.W. 2d 888 (Ky. 1955).
65 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Huffaker's Adm'r., 227 Ky. 858, 13 S.W. 2d 260
(1929).66 l]khom Coal Co. v. Tackett, 243 Ky. 694, 49 S.W. 2d 571 (1932).
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compensation shall, for the unexpired period during which their
compensation is payable, be that which such persons would have
received during such unexpired period if they had been the only
persons entitled to compensation at the time of the accident.
This section remained as enacted in the original Act until
1948 when the following phrase was added after the word "de-
pendent" in the first sentence:
Or, in the case of a child or children, upon attaining the
age of twenty years unless incapacitated from wage earn-
ing.
842.085 [4895] Definition of certain dependents. As used in this
chapter:
(1) "Child"6 7 includes step-children, legally adopted children,
posthumous children and recognized illegitimate children, but does
not include married children unless actually dependent;
(2) "Brother" and "sister" includes step-brothers, step-sisters and
brothers and sisters of the halfblood or by adoption, but excludes
married brothers or sisters unless actually dependent;
(3) "Grandchild" includes children of adopted children or step-
children, but excludes step-children of children or of adopted chil-
dren and married children;
(4) "Tarent" includes step-parents and parents by adoption; and
(5) "Adopted" and "adoption" includes cases where the persons
are legally adopted.
This section has remained substantially unchanged from the
original Act except for minor improvements in language.
842.090 [4896] Payment of death benefits in good faith; payor pro-
tected. Payment of death benefits, in good faith 8 to a supposed
dependent or to a dependent subsequent in right to another or other
dependents shall protect and discharge the employer and insurer
unless and until the lawful dependent or dependents prior in right
have given the employer or insurer written notice of his or their claim.
In case the employer or insurer is in doubt as to who are dependents
or as to their respective rights, the board shall, on application, decide
67Lockhart's Guardian v. Bailey Pond Creek Coal Co., 285 Ky. 278, 30
S.W. 2d 955 (1930) (Illegitimate child where recognized); Ramey v. Portsmouth
By-Products Coke Co., 234 Ky. 75, 27 S.W. 2d 415 (1930) (step-child included).
68 W. M. Bitter Lumber Co. v. Begley, 288 Ky. 481, 156 S.W. 2d 501 (1941);
Johnson v. Hardy-Burlingham Mining Co., 205 Ky. 752, 266 S.W. 635 (1924).
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and direct to whom payment shall be made, and payment made under
such direction shall release the employer and insurer from all liability.
If an appeal is taken from the order of the board directing payment,
persons receiving payment under such order shall furnish bond for
the protection of adverse claimants pending the outcome of the pro-
ceedings.
The present Act reads exactly as the original Act except for
the following paragraph which was contained in the original
Act but was eliminated by a subsequent amendment:
In case death occurs as a result of the injuries, after a period
of total or partial disability, period of disability shall be
deducted from the total period of compensation and the
benefits paid thereunder from the maximum allowed for
the death respectively stated in (KRS 342.070).
842.095 [4897] Compensation for total disability. (1) When the
injury or occupational disease causes total disability for work, the
employer, during such disability, except for the first seven days
thereof, shall pay the employe a weekly compensation equal to sixty-
five per cent of his average weekly earnings, not to exceed thirty-two
dollars nor less than twelve dollars per week, such payments to be
made during the period of total disability but not longer than four
hundred twenty-five weeks after the date of the injury, or after the
date his disability from an occupational disease began, nor in any
case to exceed a maximum sum of thirteen thousand six hundred
dollars. If the period of total disability begins after a period of
partial disability, the period of partial disability shall be deducted
from the total period of four hundred twenty-five weeks during which
compensation for total disability may be payable, and the payments
made on account of such partial disability shall be deducted from
the maximum of thirteen thousand, six hundred dollars.
(2) In case of the following injuries or disabilities from occupa-
tional disease the disability shall be considered total and permanent:
(a) The total permanent loss of sight in both eyes.
(b) The loss of both feet at or above the ankle.
(c) The loss of both hands at or above the wrist.
(d) A similar loss of one hand and one foot.
(e) A similar loss of one hand and one eye.
(f) A similar loss of one foot and one eye.
(g) A disability to the spine, resulting in permanent and com-
plete paralysis of both arms or both legs, or of one arm and one leg.
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(h) A disability to the skull resulting in incurable insanity or
imbecility.
(3) The enumeration in subsection (2) is not exclusive, but in all
other cases the burden of proof shall be on the claimant to prove
that his injuries or disability resulting from an occupational disease
have resulted in permanent total disability.
The general language of this section has remained unchanged
from the original Act; however, the amount of benefits payable
under this section has been frequently increased. The 1916 Act
provided for the payment of $12.00 per week not to exceed a
maximum sum of $5,000.00. By the amendment of 1918 the
waiting period was reduced from two weeks to one week. The
1920 Assembly raised the amount of weekly benefits to $15.00
with total benefits not to exceed a maximum of $6,000.00. By
1950 the benefits had been raised to a maximum of $24.00 per
week not to exceed $10,000.00 with the following additional in-
juries being considered total and permanent disabilities:
(e) A similar loss of one hand and one eye.
(f) A similar loss of one foot and one eye.
In 1956 the benefits were raised to $32.00 per week not to
exceed a maximum sum of $13,600.00, and the section was
amended to conform to the occupational disease amendments.
Total disability does not mean absolute prostration or com-
plete physical helplessness under the Act. 9 The fact that an
employee worked during the period that he was totally disabled
does not disprove total disability. 70 Disability is measured by
the ability of thbe injured employee to do the kind of work he is,
by training and experience, fitted to do, his ability to compete in
the labor market, the nature of the injuries and the kind of work
the claimant was employed to do before he sustained the injury.
71
Multiple injuries may be considered jointly as the basis of a total
disability award.
72
Although not the subject of this article, a study based on the
Illionis Workmen's Compensation Statute comparing workmen's
69 Clark v. Gilley, 311 S.W. 2d 891 (Ky. 1958); Peabody Coal Co. v. Taul-
bee, 294 S.W. 2d 925 (1956); Anderson v. Whitaker, 247 S.W. 2d 980 (1952);
Olson v. Triplett, 255 Ky. 724, 75 S.W. 2d 366 (1934).7o Comett-Lewis Coal Co. v. Day, 226 S.W. 2d 951 (Ky. 1950).
71 Garmeada Coal Co. v. Marsee, 300 Ky. 414, 189 S.W. 2d 399 (1945).
72 Central Truckaway System v. May, 299 Ky. 85, 184 S.W. 2d 889 (1945).
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compensation benefits with actual wages earned" reveals the
failure of compensation benefits to maintain today the same
percentage to wages earned when compensation acts were in-
itially enacted. Although the Acts of the various states are dif-
ferent and comparisons are deceptive, the comparisons to aver-
age wages are significant and seem generally comparable to
the scale in Kentucky.
Since the passage of the law in 1912, maximum amounts
payable for injuries which temporarily totally incapacitate
a worker have been increased from $12 to $25.50 per week
for a worker without children or with one child. This in-
crease of slightly more than double has occurred during a
period when wages rose to six times their earlier level.
Average weekly earnings rose from $12.24 in 1914 to
$74.54 per week in October, 1952.
In 1913-1914, when the law first was in effect, the maxi-
mum workmen's compensation payment of $12 per week
was just a few cents less than average weekly earnings of
$12.24 for the United States. Thus, the maximum work-
men's compensation benefits were at a level which was
98 per cent of the average earnings of production work-
ers. By 1941 workmen's compensation benefits were only
53 per cent of earnings. In the wartime years of the 1940's,
earnings increased at a much faster rate due to some
wage increases plus longer hours of work and premium
payments for overtime hours. As a result, maximum work-
men's compensation benefits experienced a marked decline
to a low point representing only 86 per cent of average
weekly earnings. A
In October, 1952, with earnings averaging $74.54 per week,
workmen's compensation benefits were $25.50 at the maxi-
mum for a family with no children or one child, which pay-
ment represented 34 per cent of average earnings. A
family with two children received only $1.70 more each
week, which payment amounted to 38 per cent of aver-
age earnings.
74
In a subsequent article originally appearing in the August,
1958 issue of the Insurance Law Journal and later reported in the
73 Katz and Wirpel, Workmen's Compensation 1910-1952: Are Present Benefits
Adequate?, 4 Labor Law Journal, No. 3 (March 1953).
74 Id at 169-70.
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November, 1958 issue of Labor Law Journal, the same Mr.
Katz brings his facts and figures "up to date" and states the fol-
lowing:
Average wages have far outstripped compensation rates
generally. Michigan, with an average weekly wage in 1957
of $97.91, has a maximum compensation rate for single
workers of $83.00 per week. A study showed that be-
tween 1914 and 1952 maximum weekly workmen's com-
pensation payments as a percentage of average weekly
wages in Illinois declined from 98 per cent to 85 per
cent. Based on real wages and real compensation rates,
the ratio in Illinois between wages and weekly compen-
sation rates is seen to decline from over 100 per cent in
1914 to 53.8 per cent in 1957. Arizona alone gives a rel-
atively free play to the compensation-wage ratio, allowing
the worker 65 per cent of his actual wages during periods
of temporary total disability if it does not exceed $150.00
per week. In 1957, the western states in a solid surge
moved against low weekly maximum rates. Oregon in-
creased its weekly maximum from $61.15 to $66.92, Cali-
fornia from- $40 to $50, Nevada from $41.54 to $51.92,
Washington from $42.69 to $56.77, Utah from $40.50 to
$47.25 and Montana from $32.50 to $42.50. In the six
major industrial states, the percentage the maximum
weekly compensation rate bore to average weekly fac-
tory earnings in 1957 was as follows: New York, 44.1 per
cent; California, 48.8 per cent; Ohio, 43.1 per cent; Penn-
sylvania, 45 per cent; Michigan, 83.7-58.2 per cent; Ill-
inois, 44-50.7 per cent.75
342.100 [4898] Compensation for temporary partial disability. In
case of an injury or disability from an occupational disease result-
ing in temporary partial disability, 76 the employe shall receive during
such disability, except the first seven days thereof, a weekly compen-
sation equal to sixty-five per cent of the difference between his aver-
age weekly earnings before the injury or disability from an occupa-
tional disease and the average weekly earnings that he earns, or is
able to earn, in some suitable employment during such disability, not
75 Katz, Workmen's Compensation in the United States, 9 Labor Law Journal,
No. 11, at 868-69.7 OMary Helen Coal Corp. v. Miller, 302 Ky. 99, 194 S.W. 2d 69 (1946);
Maynard v. Pond Creek Colliery Co., 299 Ky. 157, 184 S.W. 2d 991 (1945).
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to exceed four hundred weeks from the date of injury, or from the
date his disability from an occupational disease began; nor exceed-
ing the sum of twenty-seven dollars per week nor the maximum sum
of nine thousand, five hundred dollars. If partial disability follows
a period of total disability, the period of total disability shall be
deducted from the maximum period 'allowed for partial disability.
This section remains substantially as enacted in 1916, except
for amounts being raised through the years from $12.00 per
week in 1916 not to exceed a maximum sum of $4,000.00, to
$27.00 per week by the 1956 amendment not to exceed a maxi-
mum sum of $9,500.00. The amendment of 1956 also reduced
the waiting period from two weeks to one week.
342.105 [4899] Compensation for enumerated permanent partial
disabilities. For injuries or disabilities from an occupational disease
enumerated in the following schedule the employe shall receive, in
addition to temporary total disability compensation for the period of
actual total disability, not exceeding twenty weeks, a weekly com-
pensation equal to sixty-five percent of his average weekly earnings,
but not less than twelve dollars per week nor exceeding twenty-six
dollars per week for the periods stated thereon:
(1) For the loss of a thumb, sixty-five percent of the average
weekly wages during sixty weeks.
(2) For the loss of a first finger, commonly called the index
finger, sixty-five per cent of the average weekly wages during forty-
five weeks.
(3) For the loss of a second finger, sixty-five per cent of the aver-
age weekly wages during thirty weeks.
(4) For the loss of a third finger, sixty-five per cent of the aver-
age weekly wages during twenty weeks.
(5) For the loss of a fourth finger, commonly known as the little
finger, sixty-five per cent of the average weekly wages during fifteen
weeks.
(6) The loss of the second, or distal phalange, of the thumb
shall be considered to be equal to the loss of one-half of the thumb,
the loss of more than one-half of the thumb shall be considered equal
to the loss of the whole thumb.
(7) The loss of the third, or distal phalange of any finger shall
be considered to be equal to the loss of one-third of the finger.
(8) The loss of the middle, or second phalange, of any finger
shall be considered equal to the loss of two-thirds of the finger.
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(9) The loss of more than the middle and distal phalanges of any
finger shall be considered equal to the loss of the whole finger, but
in no case shall the amount received for more than one finger exceed
the amount provided in this schedule for the loss of a hand.
(10) For the loss of a metacarpal bone (bone of the palm) for
the corresponding thumb, finger or fingers above add ten weeks to
the number of weeks as above.
(11) For ankylosis (total stiffness of) or contractures (due to sears
or injuries) which makes the fingers more than useless, the same
number of weeks apply to such finger or fingers (not thumb) as given
above.
(12) For the loss of a hand, sixty-five per cent of the average
weekly wages during one hundred fifty weeks.
(13) For the loss of an arm, sixty-five per cent of the average
weekly wages during two hundred weeks.
(14) For the loss of one of the toes, other than the great toe,
sixty-five percent of the average weekly wages during ten weeks.
(15)For the loss of the great toe, sixty-five per cent of the aver-
age weekly wages during thirty weeks.
(16) The loss of more than two-thirds of any toe shall be con-
sidered to be equal to the loss of the whole toe.
(17) The loss of less than two-thirds of any toe shall be consid-
ered to be equal to the loss of one-half toe.
(18) For the loss of a foot, sixty-five per cent of the average
weekly wages during one hundred twenty-five weeks.
(19) For the loss of a leg, sixty-five per cent of the average weekly
wages during two hundred weeks.
(20) For the total and permanent loss of the sight of an eye,
sixty-five per cent of the average weekly wages during one hun-
dred weeks, plus an additional twenty weeks in cases where the eye-
ball is enucleated.
(21) For the total and permanent loss of hearing in one ear,
sixty-five per cent of the average weekly wages during seventy-five
weeks.
The original Act stated that the payments under this section
shall be "in lieu of all other compensation." This clause was sub-
sequently deleted. However, the section generally has remained
unchanged except that the latter part of the original Act pertain-
ing to "all other cases of permanent partial disability" was sub-
sequently made a separate section and is now KRS 42.110.
In 1948 the Assembly amended this section to provide that
the compensation enumerated therein is payable:
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in addition to temporary total disability, compensation
for the period of actual total disability, not exceeding
twenty weeks,...
The 1948 Assembly added subsection (21). The 1956 Assembly
raised the temporary total benefits to $26.00 per week and the
total amounts payable under this section.
In cases involving injuries enumerated in this section the
amount of compensation is automatically fixed by the Statute
and neither the Compensation Board nor the courts may in-
crease or reduce the amount. 
7
Where there is no severence and there is no physical injury
beyond the member itself, disability as distinguished from in-
jury must be computed to the body as a whole under KRS
342.110 without regard to the mathematical computations of
KRS 342.105."8 The latter covers payments of benefits for sever-
ance or loss of members outlined in the schedule.
7 9
842.110 [4899] Other permanent partial disability; compensation.
In all other cases of permanent partial disability, including any dis-
figurement which will impair the future usefulness or occupational
opportunities of the injured employe, or employe disabled by an
occupational disease, compensation shall be determined according
to the percentage of disability, taking into account, among other
things, any previous disability, the nature of the physical injury or
disfigurement, the occupation of the injured employe and age at
the time of injury or at the time the disability from an occupational
di sease began. In no event shall compensation for an injury or dis-
ability to a member exceed the amount allowable for the loss of
such member. The compensation paid therefor shall be sixty-five
per cent of the average weekly earnings of the employe but not
less than twelve dollars nor more than twenty-seven dollars, multi-
plied by the percentage of disability caused by the injury or occu-
pational disease, for such period as the board determines, not ex-
ceeding four hundred weeks nor a maximum sum of ten thousand,
7 Atlas Coal Co. v. Moore, 298 Ky. 767, 184 S.W. 2d 76 (Ky. 1944).78 Stumbo & Vance Coal Co. v. Tackett, 300 S.W. 2d 232 (Ky. 1957); also
see C. & C. Coal Co. v. Sheckles, 299 S.W. 2d 615 (Ky. 1957); OldKing Mining
Co. v. Pankey, 288 S.W. 2d 667 (Ky. 1957); Caney Creek Coal Co. v. Rager,
264 S.W. 2d 677 (Ky. 1954).
79Black Mountain Corp. v. Lettler, 303 Ky. 807, 199 S.W. 2d 611 (1947)
[decided prior to the 1946 amendment limiting recovery to an amount not greater
than for loss of member]; Crummies Creek Coal Co. v. Boyd, 311 Ky. 307, 223
S.W. 2d 990 (1949).
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eight hundred dollars. Compensation payable under this section shall
not be affected by the earnings of the employe after the accident,80
or after his disability from an occupational disease, whether they
be the same, or greater, or less than prior to the accident or disability
from an occupational disease. Whenever the weekly payments under
this section would be less than twelve dollars per week, the period
may be shortened and the payments correspondingly increased to
that amount. Where compensation, except as provided in KRS
342.020 and 342.030, is paid under any other provision of this chapter,
the period during which such other compensation is paid shall be
deducted from the maximum period which may be paid under this
section.
What is now KRS 342.110 had its origin as part of Section
18 of the original Act (KRS 342.105). Other than the change in
benefits this section remained substantially unchanged from the
original Act until 1946. In 1946 the following sentence was
included:,
In no event shall compensation for an injury or disability
to a member exceed the amount allowable for the loss of
such member.
0 a
In 1948 the following amendment was added:
Compensation payable under this section shall not be
affected by the earnings of the employe after the accident,
whether they be the same, or greater, or less than prior to
the accident.
Also in 1948 the provisions for deduction of compensation paid
under other sections of the chapter from the maximum paid
under this section were eliminated. The original Act provided
that "whenever the weekly payments under this paragraph would
be less than $3.00 per week, the period may be shortened and
the payments correspondingly increased to that amount.81
All other amendments increased benefits (not less than $7.00
nor more than $18.00 per week; not less than $7.00 nor more
than $21.00 per week; not less than $7.00 nor more than $24.00 per
8 0 Doan v. Cornett-Lewis Coal Co., 817 S.W. 2d 876 (Ky. 1958); Mary
Helen Coal Corp. v. Duisina, 808 Ky. 658, 215 S.W. 2d 568 (1948); Bell Coal
Co. v. Jackson, 801 Ky. 678, 192 S.W. 2d 947 (1946).
80a Old King Mining Co. v. Pankey, 288 S.W. 2d 667 (Ky. 1956); Caney
Creek Mining Co. v. Rager, 264 S.W. 2d 677 (Ky. 1954).
s1 Dosker, op cit supra note 58, at 890.
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week; not less than $12.00 nor more than $27.00 per week by
amendments in 1948, 1950, 1952 and 1956 respectively); the
1956 amendment also conformed this section to include recov-
ery for occupational diseases. By the 1956 amendment the basis
for shortening the period and increasing payment correspondingly
was raised to weekly benefits not less than $12.00 per week.
The 1946 amendment prohibiting compensation for an in-
jury to a member from exceeding an amount greater than pay-
able for the loss of the member has been the subject of much
litigation. It seems well established now, however, that if there
is total disability for work from the injury to the member and
the provisions of KRS 342.095 apply, then there is no limitation.2
But if there is less than total disability and the physical injury
does not extend beyond the member, the limitations of this sec-
tion applies.83
Under this section industry takes a man as it finds him and
if by reason of an injury some latent congenital or pre-existing
condition is lighted up, excited or aggravated, disability flowing
therefrom is compensable with due apportionment. 4 "Neurosis"
is compensable when caused by trauma, and if pre-existing,
compensable to the extent that the impairment is aggravated. 5
Permanent facial disfigurement is a permanent partial disability
within the meaning of this section.8 6 Determination of appor-
tionment must be based on competent medical testimony.
8 7
Where the Board finds that the claimant is totally disabled,
the award for an injury to a member is made under KRS 342.095
without consideration of the limitation of KRS 342.110. 8
842.111 Continuance of disability payments to dependents when
employe dies before all of disability award has been paid. (1) When
82 Clark v. Gilley, 311 S.W. 2d 391 (Ky. 1958).
8 3 Stumbo & Vance Coal Co. v. Tackett, 300 S.W. 2d 232 (Ky. 1957), and
cases cited therein as to how an award should be computed in reference to KRS
842.105 and KRS 342.110.84 Parrott v. Healy, 290 S.W. 2d 798 (Ky. 1956); does "condition" include
"disease," and, if so, what effect does this disease have on KRS 342.005, where
"pre-exdsting disease" but not 'condition" is mentioned.85 Eastern Coal Co. v. Mullins, 290 S.W. 2d 468 (Ky. 1956); Old King
Mining Co. v. Mullins, 252 E.W. 2d 871 (Ky. 1952).
86 National Distilleries Products Corp. v. Jones, 309 Ky. 894, 217 S.W. 2d
813 (1949).87 Contractors Service & Supply Co. v. Chism. 316 S.W. 2d 840 (Ky. 1958);
Hardman v. Owensboro Forging Co., 309 S.W. 2d 339 (Ky. 1958); Parrott v.
Healy, 290 S.W. 2d 798 (Ky. 1956).
88 Clark v. Giley, 311 S.W. 2d 391 (Ky. 1958).
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an employe, who has been awarded diasbility compensation by the
Workmen's Compensation Board, shall die as a result of such injury
or occupational disease prior to the payment to him of the amount
of the award, then the dependents of the deceased employe shall
be allowed and paid all allowed and unpaid awards made to such
employe. Provided, however, that the dependents of such deceased
employe shall, within six months after the death of such employe, ifie
with the Workmen's Compensation Board, in such form as the board
may require, a written verified application, stating therein the date
of the death of such deceased employe; the amount of such allowed
and uncollected award; the name, age, postoffice address, and the
relation of each said dependents to the deceased. Thereupon the
Workmen's Compensation Board shall notify in writing the company,
person or insurance carrier against whom such award was made;
and shall fix a time and place for a hearing, of which notice shall be
given, to determine the dependency of those making such claim; and
shall make an award or order for the benefit of those found to be en-
titled thereto. Provided, however, that the number of weekly pay-
ments to be paid to the dependents shall be the number of weeks
remaining after deducting the number of weekly payments made
to the decedent from the number of weeks allowed in the original
award.
(2) The total amount paid and payable to the decedent and his
dependents shall not exceed the amount now payable for death at
the average weekly wage of the decedent at the time of his injury,
and the weekly payments to the dependents shall not exceed the sum of
fifteen dollars a week.
This section appeared for the first time in the 1942 Act and
has remained substantially unchanged except for an increase in
benefits through the years to the present amount.
In 1956 this section was amended to provide for occupational
diseases.
The time for filing the application provided in subsection (1)
of this section is mandatory, but the form is merely directory. 9
The continuation of disability payments to dependents of
employees after his death are payable only where there has been
an award of compensation by the Board 0
842.115 [4900] Refusal of proper employment forfeits compensa-
tion. If an injured employe refuses employment reasonably suited
8 9 (Manchester Coal Co. v. Haynes, 307 Ky. 838, 212 S.W. 2d 815 (1948).90 Adkinis v. International Harvester Co., 286 S.W. 2d 528 (Ky. 1956).
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to his capacity and physical condition procured for him, he shall not
be entitled to compensation during the period of such refusal unless,
in the opinion of the board, such refusal was justifiable.91
This section is exactly as written in the original Act.
An injured employee is not required to report to either his
former employer or the Board when he obtains new employ-
ment.
92
842.120 [4901] Subsequent injury, compensation in case of; pay-
ments from Subsequent Injury Fund. (1) If any employe who is per-
manently partially disabled, whether from a compensable injury or
otherwise receives a subsequent compensable injury by accident re-
sulting in additional permanent disability so that the degree of dis-
ability caused by the combined disabilities is greater than that which
would have resulted from the subsequent injury alone, and such
employe is entitled to receive compensation on the basis of the
combined disabilities, the employer shall be liable only for the de-
gree of disability which would have resulted from the latter injury
had there been no pre-existing disability. After the compensation
liability of the employer, or his insurance carrier, if any, has been
fully discharged, the remaining compensation to which such result-
ing condition would entitle the employe, less all compensation which
the provisions of this chapter would have afforded on account of the
prior disability had it been compensated for thereunder, shall be
paid out of the Subsequent Injury Fund provided for in subsection
(1) of KRS 84.122.
(2) The term "permanent partial disability" under the provi-
sions of this section shall not include disease or pre-existing disease,
except where the disease or pre-existing disease was the natural
and direct result of a compensable injury, or the disease or pre-
existing disease was contracted by the employe while a member of
the Armed Forces of the United States and was sustained in line of
duty while the United States was engaged in war.
842.121 Reference of medical questions in subsequent injury cases
to panel of physicians; conclusiveness of findings; review. (1) If on a
claim for compensation for disability resulting from a subsequent in-
jury by accident any medical question shall be in controversy, or a
determination thereof necessary to the proper apportionment of
91 Black Mountain Corp. v. Gilbert, 296 Ky. 514, 177 S.W. 2d 894 (1944).
92 Bell Coal Co. v. Jackson, 801 Ky. 673, 192 S.W. 2d 947 (1946).
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liability therefor, the board shall refer the case to a panel appointed
by it of not less than two nor more than three disinterested physi-
cians in the territory where the controversy occurred, for the pur-
pose of investigating and reporting to the board on the medical
questions involved. The panel shall make its report to the Work-
men's Compensation Board in writing with respect to all medical
questions at issue or necessary to the apportionment of disability be-
tween the subsequent injury and the prior existing disability at the
time of employment. The report shall show the date of prior dis-
ablement which, if in dispute, shall be deemed a medical question.
(2) The physicians appointed as provided in subsection (1) of
this section shall be allowed necessary traveling expenses and reason-
able fees, to be fixed by the board but not to exceed a fee of twenty
dollars to each physician for making such examination and report,
plus a reasonable allowance for expenses incurred in making such
examination. The board may also allow traveling expenses to the
employe. Such fees and expenses so approved by the board shall be
paid out of the Subsequent Injury Fund in cases for subsequent
injuries.
(3) The medical panel shall, as soon as practicable after it has
completed its consideration of the case, report in writing its findings
on every medical question in controversy. The medical panel shall
also include in its report a statement indicating the physician or
physicians, if any, who appeared before it, and what, if any, medical
reports and X-rays were considered by it.
(4) The decision or award in the case shall conform to the find-
ings and conclusions in such report in so far as restricted to medical
questions; provided, however, that any such findings and conclu-
sions may be set aside, reversed or modified, by the board's award
or decision, in case an application for review is made to the board
within ten days after the report is filed with the board and the in-
terested parties notified, subject, however, to the following special
provisions; no such findings of the medical panel shall be subject
to review unless specific objections thereto shall be filed with the
board by a party in interest within the time limited in which to
apply for review of such report.
(5) The provisions of this section shall apply only to persons men-
tioned in KRS 342.120.
The original Act, which contained a "subsequent injury"
section, remained unaltered until 1946, and read as follows:
If a previously injured employe sustains a subsequent in-
jury which results in a condition to which both injuries,
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or their effects, contribute the employer in whose employ-
ment the subsequent injury is sustained shall be liable
only for the compensation to which such reulting condi-
tion entitled the employe, less all compensation which
the provisions of this law would have afforded on account
of the prior injury or injuries had they been compensated
for thereunder.9 3
The 1946 amendment changed this section to its present form
except for a new section which was added, becoming KRS
842.121. 94 With the 1948 amendment these sections were
amended to their present form.
The leading case on the Subsequent Injury Fund and what
constitutes an "original" disability is Combs v. Gaffney, 282
S.W. 2d 817 (Ky. 1955).95
342.122 Subsequent Injury Fund; tax for; credits and withdraw-
als; continuance from year to year; maximum limit. (1) In addition to
the taxes and assesments imposed by KRS 342.450 and 342.475, a Sub-
sequent Injury Fund Tax at the rate of three-fourths of one per cent
of the amount of premiums received shall be paid by every insur-
ance carrier as defined in KRS 342.445, subject to the credits therein
set out, and the board shall assess against the payrolls of every em-
ployer carrying his own risk a Subsequent Injury Fund Tax com-
puted by taking three-fourths of one per cent of the basic premiums
determined as provided in KRS 342.475. The provisions of KRS
342.450, 842.455, 842.460, 842.465 and 842.470 shall, so far as ap-
plicable, also apply to the levy and collection of such additional tax
of three-fourths of one per cent of such premiums of insurance
carriers.
(2) All taxes and assessments imposed by subsection (1) of this
section shall be paid into the State Treasury and shall be credited
to the Subsequent Injury Fund for the board, which fund shall be
used only for the payment of awards of compensation made by the
board and chargeable against said fund, expenses of legal represen-
tation thereof, fees and expenses of the Medical Committee in con-
nection therewith, and shall be withdrawn for that purpose under
the supervision of the Commissioner of Industrial Relations.
93 Dosker op cit supra note 53 at 416.
94 Afred v. Jones Construction Co., 313 S.W. 2d 867 (Ky. 1958); Mary Helen
Coal Corp. v. Anderson, 262 S.W. 2d 841 (Ky. 1953).
95 For other significant cases on subsequent injuries see Pioneer Coal Co.
v. Sparks, 249 S.W. 2d 725 (Ky. 1952), and cases cited therein.
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(3) Any sum remaining in the Subsequent Injury Fund to the
credit of the Workmen's Compensation Board at the end of any
fiscal year shall be set up by the Department of Finance to the credit
of the board in such fund for the next ensuing fiscal year.
(4) If the amount to the credit of the Subsequent Injury Fund
as of June 30 of any year exceeds $75,000, the tax of three-fourths
of one per cent upon insurance premiums provided for under sub-
section (1) of this section and the three-fourths of one per cent as-
sessment upon employers carrying their own risk provided for under
subsection (1) of this section shall not be assessed or collected dur-
ing the ensuing year.
This section was enacted originally in 1946 and has remained
unchanged except for an amendment to subsection (2) in 1954
adding the words "expenses of legal representation thereof" fol-
lowing the words "chargeable against said fund."
842.125 [4902] Review by board of previous award or order.
Upon its own motion or upon the application of any party interested
and a showing of change of conditions, mistake or fraud, the board
may at any time review any award or order, ending, diminishing or
increasing the compensation previously awarded, within the maxi-
mum and minimum provided in this chapter, or change or revoke its
previous order, sending immediately to the parties a copy of its
subsequent order or award. Review under this section shall be had
upon notice to the parties interested and shall not affect the previous
order or award as to any sums already paid thereunder.
This section has remained unchanged from its original enact-
ment in 1916. 5'
In Harvey Coal Co. v. Colwell, 313 S.W. 2d 274, Ky. 1958), the
Court of Appeals held where an employee was paid a lump sum in sat-
isfaction of an award for disability from the Occupational disease of
silicosis, a claim for further compensation made moer than one year
after the last payment was barred by KRS 342.316(3) because KRS
ora For a thorough discussion of this section and its interpretation by the Court
of Appeals see: Doan v. Comett-Lewis Coal Co., 317 S.W. 2d 876 (Ky. 1958);
Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Meade, 289 S.W. 2d 503 (Ky. 1956); Clear Fork
Coal Co. v. Gaylord, 286 S.W. 2d 519 (Ky. 1956); Jude v. Cubbage, 251
S.W. 2d 584 (Ky. 1952); Wells v. Fox Ridge Mining Co., 243 S.W. 2d 676
(Ky. 1951); W. E. Caldwell Co. v. Borders, 801 Ky. 843, 193 S.W. 2d 453
1946); Dept. of Highways v. Harrell, 291 Ky. 90, 163 S.W. 2d 287 (1942);
Crummies Creek Coal Co. v. Hensley, 284 Ky. 243, 144, S. W. 2d 206 (1940);
Ray v. Black Mountain Corp., 254 Ky. 800, 72 S.W. 2d 477 (1934).
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342.316(3) was enacted after KRS 342.125 and therefore was con-
trolling.96
As to what is necessary to reopen a claim when the settle-
ment agreement has not been filed with the board, see: Law
Moisture Co. v. Vandiver, 260 S.W. 2d 395 (Ky. 1953); Hodgkin
v. Webb, 310 Ky. 745, 221 S.W. 2d 664 (1949); but also see
Fiorella v. Clark, 298 Ky. 817, 184 S.W. 2d 208 (1944).
342.180 [4903] Compensation of alien dependents. Compensation
under this chapter to alien dependent widows and children, not
residents of the United States, shall be one-half of the amount pro-
vided in each case for residents. The employer may at any time
commute all future installments of compensation to alien dependents
the then value thereof. Alien widowers, parents, brothers and sisters
not residents of the United States, shall not be entitled to any com-
pensation.
This section has remained unchanged from its enactment
in 1916 and has survived constitutional attack in Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Vidigoi, 207 Ky. 841, 270 S.W. 472 (1925); nor
is the denial of beniefits to parents living in Italy of an unnatural-
ized native of Italy in conflict with a treaty with Italy."'
842.185 [4904] Notive, how served; notice to nonresident alien.
Any notice required to be given under this chapter shall be consid-
ered properly given and served when deposited in the mail in a
registered letter or package properly stamped and addressed to the
person to whom notice is to be given at his last known address and
in time to reach him in due time to act thereon. Notice may also be
given and served like notices in civil actions. Any notice given and
served as provided in this section to the consular representative of
the nation of which any nonresident dependent of a deceased em-
ploye is a citizen or subject, or to the authorized agent or representa-
06 A motion to reopen may be filed with the Board even though a suit to
enforce the award is pending in circuit court, Oldham v. Officers' Club of Fort
Knox, 244 S.W. 2d 478 (Ky. 1951), but see Lincoln Coal Co. v. Watts, 275 Ky.
130, 120 S.W. 2d 1026 (1938) and Farmer Motor Co. v. Smith, 249 Ky. 445, 60
S.W. 2d 929 (1933). As to the date that increased payments begin, the date of
the motion to reopen, where the award is reopened and the amount of compensa-
tion increased, see Thompson v. Harlan-Wallins Coal Co., 256 S.W. 2d 10 (Ky.
1953); Hayden v. Elkhorn Coal Corp., 238 S.W. 2d 138 (Ky. 1951); Williams
v. Gordon, 313 Ky. 377, 231 S.W. 2d 89 (1950).
97 Norella v. Maryland Casualty Co., 216 Ky. 29, 289 S.W. 18 (1926).
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five of any such official residing in this state, shall be deemed to have
been properly given and served upon such dependent.
This section has remained unchanged since its enactment in
1916.
842.140 [4905] Compensation computed on average weekly wage;
computation for employe who has worked only a short time; com-
putation at highest grade. (1) Compensation shall be computed at
the average weekly wage earned by the employe at the time of in-
jury reckoning wages as earned while working at fulltime. "At full
time" as used herein means a full working day for five days in every
week of the year regardless of whether the injured employe actually
worked all or part of the time. If the employe shall not have been
employed a sufficient length of time to establish an average weekly
wage, then compensation shall be based upon the average weekly
wage as herein defined of those employes of the same employer
in the same or most similar type of employment.
(2) If the employe, at the time of the injury, is regularly em-
ployed in a higher grade of work or occupation than formerly during
the year, and with larger regular wages, only such higher grade or
work or occupation, if it is not seasonal, shall be taken into con-
sideration in computing his average weekly wages.
This section remained unchanged until 1946. In that year the
language defining "at full time" was added. The 1946 amendment
may have been enacted because of a 1944 Court of Appeals
decision wherein "full time" was held to be, following a long
line of Court of Appeals decisions, a six-day week.""
842.145 [4906] Deduction of voluntary payments; payments monthly
or quartely. (1) Any payments made or the value of supplies fur-
nished by the employer or his insurer during the period of disability,
to the employe or his dependents, which by the terms of this chapter
were not due or payable when made or furnished, may, with the
approval of the board, be deducted from the amount payable as
compensation.
(2) The board may, on the application of either party, with re-
gard both to the welfare of the employe and the convenience and
financial ability of the employer, authorize compensation to be paid
monthly or quarterly.
98 Chickasaw Wood Products Co. v. Babbs, 298 Ky. 409, 182 S.W. 2d 953
(1944).
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This section has remained unchanged since its enactment in
1916, except that the words "in its discretion" were deleted in
subsection (2) after the word "party." The Board's approval
of credit for money and supplies furnished the injured employee
is within the sound discretion of the Board and the courts should
not interfere with that discretion unless the Board acts in a
capricious, arbitrary or unreasonable manner.99
842.150 [4907] Lump sum compensation; when and how made.
Whenever compensation has been paid for not less than six months,
thereafter, on the application of either party and upon notice to the
other party, in any case where the board determines that it will be
for the best interests of either party and will not subject the em-
ployer or his insurer to an undue risk of overpayment, future pay-
ments of compensation or any part thereof may be commuted to a
lump sum of an amount which will equal the total sum of the prob-
able future payments so commuted, discounted at five per cent per
annum on each payment. Upon payment of such lump sum all lia-
bility for the payments therein commuted shall cease.
This section has remained unchanged since its enactment
in 1916. In the absence of fraud the Board has complete dis-
cretion in directing or refusing to direct a lump sum settlement,
and in the absence of fraud the Court of Appeals does not have
jurisdiction of any appeal from the Board's order.100
842.155 [4908] Lump sum compensation may be paid to trustee.
Whenever the board considers it expedient, any lump sum which is
paid as provided in KRS 842.150 hereof shall be paid to any suitable
person appointed by the county judge of the county of the residence
of the injured employe or of his dependents as trustee to administer
or apply the same for the benefit of the person or persons entitled
thereto. The receipt of such trustee for the amount so paid to him
shall discharge the employer and his insurer. Except as otherwise
herein specifically provided, the manner of qualification and the
rights, duties and liabilities of such trustee shall be determined by
the general laws of this state.
99 Harlan Collieries Co. v. Johnson, 308 Ky. 89, 212 S.W. 2d 540 (1948).
100 Black Mountain Corp. v. Davenport, 280 Ky. 302, 133 S.W. 2d 102
(1939) and cases cited therein.
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Except for a minor change in the language of the first sen-
tence, this section has remained as enacted in the 1916 Act.
842.160 [4909] Payments to certain dependents for others; applica-
tion when dependents under legal disability. (1) The benefits in
case of death shall be paid to such one or more dependents of the
deceased employe for the benefit of all the dependents entitled
thereto, as are determined by the board.' 0 ' The dependents to whom
payments are made shall apply the same to the use of the persons
entitled thereto under this chapter, according to their respective
claims on the deceased for support. The compensation of an insane
person shall be paid to his committee.
(2) If the dependents are a widow or other head of a family of
minor children and one or more minor children, it shall be sufficient
for the widow or head of the family to make application for com-
pensation on behalf of all. Where the dependents are mentally in-
capacitated or are minors the head of whose family is not a dependent,
the application may be made by the committee, guardian or next
friend of such dependents.
This section is substantially the same as when enacted into
the 1916 Act. A recognized minor illegitimate child can make
application by next friend for benefits.0 2
342.165 [4910] Increase or decrease in compensation for failure
to comply with safety law. If an accident is caused in any degree
by the intentional failure of the employer to comply with any specific
statute or lawful regulation made thereunder, communicated to such
employer and relative to installation or maintenance of safety appli-
ances or methods, the compensation for which the employer would
otherwise have been liable under this act shall be increased fifteen
per cent in the amount of each payment. If an accident is caused in
any degree by the intentional failure of the employe to use any safety
appliance fiurnished by the employer or to obey any lawful and
reasonable rule, order or regulation of the board or the employer
for the safety of employes or the public, the compensation for which
the employer would otherwise have been liable under this chapter,
shall be decreased fifteen per cent in the amount of each payment.
'o' Davis v. Mitchell, 266 Ky. 151, 98 S.W. 2d 474 (1936).
'102Lockhart's Guardian v. Bailey Pond Creek Coal Co., 285 Ky. 278, 30 S.W.
2d 955 (1980).
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Nothing in this sction shall be construed to conflict with or impair
KRS 342.015.
This section is substantially the same as when enacted into
the 1916 Act. The question of willful or intentional violation of a
safety rule or intentional failure to comply with the statute or
regulations is a matter for determination by the Board.0 3 The
intentional violation of a safety rule by the employee shall cause
the compensation award to be diminished by 15%.104
842.170 [4911] Minor illegally employed. If any minor employe is
injured or killed while being employed by the employer in willful
and known violation 0 5 of any law of this state regulating the em-
ployment of minors, the statutory guardian or personal representative
of the minor may claim compensation under this chapter or may sue
to recover damages as if this chapter did not exist. But if a minor
under sixteen years of age who has procured his employment upon
written certification that he is over sixteen years of age, as provided
in KRS 342.065, is killed, his parents, statutory guardian or personal
representative may not sue to recover damages, but must rely on his
claim, if any, for compensation under the terms of this chapter. If a
claim for compensation is made under this section, the making of such
claim shall be a waiver and bar to all rights of action on account
of that injury or death as to all persons, and the institution of an
action to recover damages on account of such injury or death shall
be a waiver and bar of all rights to compensation under this chapter.
Except for minor changes in language the 1916 Act as
amended by the 1924 Assembly is the same as the present section.
842.175 [4912] Lien for compensation. All rights of compensation
granted by this chapter shall have the same preference or priority
for the whole thereof against the assets of the employer as is allowed
by law for any unpaid wages for labor.
This section has remained unchanged from the Act of 1916.
The purpose of this section is clearly to protect the disabled
employee's loss of power by reason of his disability or injury
suffered to earn a livelihood and should be given a liberal con-
103 Black Mountain Corp. v. Vaughn, 280 Ky. 270, 132 S.W. 2d 988 (1989).1 04 Big Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Burke, 206 Ky. 989, 267 S.W. 142 (1925).
105 Riddells Adm'r. v. Berry, 298 S.W. 2d 1 (Ky. 1957); Caldwell v. Jarvis,
299 Ky. 439, 185 S.W. 2d 552 (1945).
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struction. 10 In a bankruptcy proceeding in Kentucky a claim
against the bankrupt employer arising out of a workmen's com-
pensation award in a death case was entitled to priority over
claims of the general creditors. 0 7 However, the lien on the em-
ployer's property to secure unemployment compensation con-
tributions under KRS 341.310, is superior to a lien on the employ-
er's assets to secure workmen's compensation awards under this
section. 08
342.180 [4913] Compensation claim not assignable; exempt from
debts. No claim for compensation under this chapter shall be as-
signable; and all compensation and claims therefor shall be exempt
from all claims of creditors.
This section has remained unchanged from the 1916 enact-
ment. However, it has been held that property purchased with
money received through a lump sum settlement of a workmen's
compensation award as a result of a death of an injured em-
ployee was not exempt from execution under this section.'
842.185 [4914] Notice of accident; claim for compensation; time of
filing. No proceeding under this chapter for compensation for an
injury or death shall be maintained unless a notice of the accident
shall have been given to the employer as soon as practicable after the
happening thereof and unless a claim for compensation with respect
to such injury shall have been made within one year after the date
of the accident, or, in case of death, within one year after such
death, whether or not a claim has been made by the employe him-
self for compensation. Such notice and such claim may be given or
made by any person claiming to be entitled to compensation or by
some one in his behalf. If payments of compensation as such have
been made voluntarily the maling of a claim within such period
shall not be required, but shall become requisite following the
suspension of such voluntary payments. In cases of the disease of
silicosis, caused by the inhalation of silica dust, no application for
106 Atkins v. Carroll, 281 Ky. 328, 136 S.W. 2d 32 (1940).
10 7 In re Hall-Luton Coal Mining Co., 29 F. Supp. 484 (1939).
108 Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Durham, 290 Ky. 403, 161 S.W. 2d 610
(1942).
19 Ball v. Smiddy, 249 S.W. 2d 715 (Ky. 1952). As to the right of a second
spouse to the benefits of his wife's estate made up of sums from a workmens
compensation settlement from wife's first husband's death, see Smith v. Vanover,
264 S.W. 2d 884 (Ky. 1954).
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compensation shall be considered unless notice is given and claim
is made within three years after the last injurious exposure to silica
dust.
This section remained substantially unchanged until 1948
when it was amended by adding the last sentence which estab-
lished the section as it reads today. It is interesting to note
that this section was not amended when the Occupational Dis-
ease Act was passed in 1956. Therefore, to the extent of the limi-
tations of this section and the other limitations set out in KRS
842.316 as to silicosis, the occupational disease of silicosis is con-
sidered differently from the other occupational disease provided
for in KRS 342.816 [for a discussion of related problems and the
effect of a subsequent amendment being controlling, particu-
larly in relation to KRS 342.816(8), see Harvey Coal Co. v. Col-
well, 818 S.W. 2d 274 (Ky. 1958)].
The section has been the subject of much litigation. As to
what is the giving of notice "as soon as practicable," each case
turns on its own facts, with the employer having to show that
he was in some way prejudiced' or misled by the delay in giv-
ing notice. Or the employee must show that there was some
justifying excuse for the delay."1
842.190 [4915] Notice and claim to be in writing, contents. The
notice and claim shall be in writing. The notice shall contain the name
and address of the employe, and shall state in ordinary language
the time, place of occurrence, nature and cause of the accident, with
names of witnesses, the nature and extent of the injury sustained, and
the work or employment in which the employe was at the time en-
gaged, and shall be signed by him or a person on his behalf, or, in
case of his death, by any one or more of his dependents or a person
on their behalf. The notice may include the claim.
This section has remained unchanged from the 1916 Act. It
has been held by the Court of Appeals, however, that giving
of written notice is only directory and any verbal notice of the
injury is sufficient." 2
110 Old King Mining Co. v. Mullins, 252 S.W. 2d 871 (Ky. 1952).
I11 Sexton v. Black Star Coal Co., 296 S.W. 2d 450 (Ky. 1956); Mengel Co.
v. Axley, 311 Ky. 631, 224 S.W.-2d 921 (1949). (Also see KRS 342.200).
112 Carr v. Wheeler, 265 S.W. 2d 490 (Ky. 1954).
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342.195 [4916] Notice and claim; how served. The notice and
claim shall be given to the employer, or if the employer is a partner-
ship, then to any one of the partners. If the employer is a corpor-
ation, the notice or claim may be given to any agent of the corpor-
ation upon whom process may be served, or to any officer of the
corporation or agent of the corporation in charge of the business at
the place where the injury occurred. Notice or claim may be given
by delivery to any such person or as provided in KRS 342.135.
With the 1922 Amendment which inserted the words "or
claim" in the first line, this section has remained unchanged to
date.113 Where an officer or agent in charge of the business of a
corporation had personal knowledge of the injury, further notice
was not necessary.
1 14
842.200 [4917] Certain defects or failure to give notice not to bar
compensation. The notice shall not be invalid or insufficient because
of any inaccuracy in complying with KRS 342.190 unless it is shown
that the employer was in fact misled to his injury thereby. Want of
notice or delay in giving notice shall not be a bar to proceedings
under this chapter if it is shown that the employer, his agent or
representative had knowledge of the injury or that the delay or
failure to give notice was occasioned by mistake or other reasonable
cause.114a
This section has remained unchanged from the 1916 Act." 5
The Court of Appeals has ruled in several cases on what con-
stitutes reasonable cause or excuse, with each case turning on
its own facts in light of the statutory requirements. 61
342.205 [4918] Right of employer to require continued physical
examination; effect of employe's refusal. After an injury and so long
as compensation is claimed, the workman, if requested by his em-
ployer or by the board, shall submit himself to examination, at reason-
113 Dosker, op. cit supra note 53, at 476.
114 Bates & Rogers Construction Co. v. Emmons, 205 Ky. 21, 265 S.W. 447
(1924).
114a See cases cited in footnotes 110 and 111, supra, and footnote 116, infra.
15 See Ironto nFire Brick Co. v. Madden, 285 S.W. 2d 897 (Ky. 1956).
116 Sexton v. Black Star Coal Corp., 296 S.W. 2d 450, (Ky. 1956) and cases
cited therein; U. S. Steel Corp. v. Birchfield, 296 S.W. 2d 726 (Ky. 1956); Harlan
Fuel Co. v. Burkhart, 296 S.W. 2d 722; Deal v. U. S. Steel Corp., 296 S.W. 2d
724 (Ky. 1956).
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able time and places, to a duly qualified physician or surgeon desig-
nated and paid by the employer. The employe shall have the right
to have a duly qualified physician or surgeon designated and paid
by himself present at such examination, but this right shall not
deny the employer's physician or surgeon the right to visit the in-
jured employe at all reasonable times and under all reasonable
conditions. If an employe refuses to submit himself to or in any way
obstructs such examination his right to take or prosecute any pro-
ceedings under this chapter shall be suspended until such refusal
or obstruction ceases. No compensation shall be payable for the
period during which the refusal or obstruction continues.
This section has remained generally unchanged from the 1916
Act. However, it has been held that an employer could not for
the first time three years after an employee had sustained an in-
jury resulting in a hernia require that employee submit to an
operation as a condition of receiving compensation." 7 It has been
further held that a claimant's refusal to submit to an examin-
ation in another city, after the Referee had awarded plaintiff
compensation and the plaintiff had already made three trips
upon employer's request, did not violate this section.""
842.210 [4919] Limitation of time not to run against minors or
incompetents. No limitation of time provided in this chapter shall
run against any person who is mentally incompetent or who is a minor
dependent so long as he has no committee, guardian or next friend,
or other person authorized to claim compensation for him under
KRS 342.160.119
Except for the 1924 amendment which added after the words
"next friend" the words "or other persons authorized to claim
compensation for him under K1RS 342.160,"ll pa this section has
remained unchanged from the original Act.
842.215 [4618-112; 4920] Workmen's Compensation Board; ap-
pointment; term; vacancies; chairman. (1) The Workmen's Compen-
17 Mullins v. Ky.-W. Va. Gas Co., 307 S.W. 2d 169 (Ky. 1957).
(1 8 Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Roberts, 293 Ky. 75, 168 S.W. 2d 573
(143).
1" See Inland Gas Corp. Flint, 269 S.W. 2d (Ky. 1954); Davis v. Mitchell,
266 Ky. 151, 98 S.W. 2d 474 (1936); McIntosh v. Gorman Coal Co. 253 Ky. 160
(1934).
11a Dosker, Workmten's Compensation in Kentucky 505 (1st ed. 1916).
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sation Board shall consist of five members appointed by the Gov-
ernor and shall be a part of the Department of Industrial Relations.
(2) Each mepnber of the board shall hold office for four years
and until his successor is appointed and qualified. Upon the expir-
ation of the term of any member, his successor shall be appointed
for a full term of four years. Vacancies shall be filled by appoint-
ment for the unexpired term.
(3) The Governor shall designate a member of the board to serve
as chairman for a term of four years. Any vacancy in the chairman-
ship shall be filled by the Governor.
The Original Act provided for three Board members. The
1956 Legislature raised the number of Board members to five.
Another amendment in 1956 also provides for a five member
board and changed the method of designating the board chair-
man. Subsections (1) and (2) of KRS 342.215 as set forth in
each of the two amendments are identical, with the only con-
flict appearing in subsection (3) as set forth therein. Under the
authority of Sumpter v. Burchett, 304 Ky. 858, 202 S.W. 2d 735
(1947), effect is given to the later amendment.
KRS 342.220-KRS 342.255 concern administrative details
relating to the Board, its employees and its operation.
The original Act of 1916 (which requirement is no longer
part of the Act) provided that each member of the Board give
a bond of $10,000 as surety for the faithful performance of his
duties, with the premium to be paid out of the Maintenance
Fund.20
The Board has historically met on the first and third Tues-
days of each month at its main office in Frankfort, Kentucky,
with a majority of the Board constituting a quorum for the trans-
action of business.12'
All proceedings of the Board are recorded in an Order Book
and limitations on the time for filing a petition for review begins
to run on the date an award is entered in the Order Book, even
though the Order Book is not signed by the Chairman of the
Board until the next regular meeting.1
22
The Referees hear the parties and their witnesses. After
120 The requirement that the member give fuilltime to the work of the Board
was eliminated by Amendment in 1956.
121 KRS 342.255.
122 Ca-nahan Oil & Refining Co. v. Miller, 232 Ky. 78, 22 S.W. 2d 430 (1925).
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all the evidence is filed, the case is submitted to a referee, who
writes an opinion, including findings of facts and rulings of law.
However, these orders and awards of the Referees do not be-
come those of the Board until a majority of the Board have ap-
proved same and said orders or awards are entered on the record
of the Board's proceedings.2 Nor is an award by a Referee a final
order reversible by the court until approved by the Board.124
The Court of Appeals has consistently held that the Board is
not a court within the meaning of the Kentucky Constitution or
Kentucky statutes, but rather is an administrative agency ap-
pointed by law to find the facts in cases submitted to it and apply
the law to those facts 2 5 to effectuate the purpose of the statute.
2
G
842.260 [4618-112; 4930] Board to make rules; procedure; sub-
poena; duties of sheriff; circuit court. (1) The board shall prepare
such rules and regulations as it considers necessary to carry on its
work and may make rules not inconsistent with this chapter for
carrying out the provisions of this chapter.
(2) Processes and procedure under this chapter shall be as sum-
mary and simple as reasonably possible. The board or any member
thereof for the purpose of this chapter, may subpoena witnesses, ad-
minister or cause to have administered oaths and examine or cause to
have examined such parts of the books and records of the parties
to a proceeding as relate to question in dispute.
(3) The sheriff shall serve all subpoenas of the boardo and shall
receive the same fee as provided by law for like service in civil
actions. Each witness who appears in obedience to such subpoena
of the board shall receive for attendance the fees and mileage for
witnesses in civil cases in the circuit courts.
(4) The circuit court shall, on application of the board or any
member thereof, enforce by proper proceedings the attendance and
testimony of witnesses and the production and examination of books,
papers and records.
This section is substantially the same as found in the 1916 Act.
The right of the Board to make procedural rules is limited by
123 Spencer v. Chobies Coal Co., 280 Ky. 152, 132 S.W. 2d 746 (1939).
124 Crunmies Creek Coal Co. v. Hensley, 284 Ky. 243, 144 S.W. 2d 206
(1940).
125 Sears v. Elcomb Coal Co., 253 Ky. 279, 69 S.W. 2d 382 (1934).
126 Broadway & Fourth Avenue Realty Co. v. Metcalfe, 230 Ky. 800, 20 S.W.
2d 988 (1929).
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the express restrictive provision that said rules must not be in-
consistent with the provisions of this Act. 27
The most recent rules of practice and procedure of the Board
were promulgated in October, 1957, and on October 22, 1958.128
Administrative rules and regulations are not effective until
thirty days after filing with Legislative Research Committee.
[KRS 18.0857].
It has been consistently held by the Court of Appeals that
technical rules of common law and code pleading are not
generally to be observed in proceedings before the Board. 29
The Board's control over its own proceedings is extensive
and includes the right to refuse to consider a deposition of a wit-
ness, even though taken by agreement, where the deposition was
taken after the Board's time for alloting of proof had passed.3 °
The Board has discretion in determining whether or not evi-
dence which properly should have been introduced in chief but
which was introduced in rebuttal may be considered.13' The
same is true as to newly discovered evidence. (United States
Coal & Coke Co. v. Gilley, 296 Ky. 522, 177 S.W. 2d 877 (1944).
342.265 [4931] Compensation agreements; subject to approval of
board. If the employe and employer reach an agreement conforming
to the provisions of this chapter in regard to compensation, a memor-
andum of the agreement shall be filed with the board, and, if approved
by it, shall be enforceable as is herein provided for the enforcement
of awards of the board. Nothing herein shall prevent the volun-
tary payment of compensation in the amounts and for the periods
prescribed in this chapter without formal agreement, but nothing
shall operate as a final settlement except a memorandum of agree-
ment filed with and approved by the board in accordance with this
section or the expiration of the time limit prescribed in KRS
42.185.1-32
This section has remained unchanged from its enactment
in 1916, but was re-enacted in 1952. It has been held that where
127 Washington v. Clover Fork Coal Co., 269 Ky. 604, 108 S.W. 2d 502
(1939).
128 The rules of practice and procedure adopted by the board are set forth in
Appendix I.
129 Perry McGlone Construction Co. v. Shaw, 283 Ky. 84, 140 S.W. 2d 829
(1940); Crutcher Dental Depot v. Miller, 251 Ky. 201, 64 S.W. 2d 466 (1933).
130 Mitchell v. Jacks Creek Mining Co., 248 S.W. 2d 926 (Ky. 1952).
'31 Wells v. General Electric Co., 318 S.W. 2d 865 (Ky. 1958); International
Harvester Co. v. Brown, 286 S.W. 2d 920 (Ky. 1956).
1
32 Adkins v. International Harvester Co., 286 S.W. 2d 528 (Ky. 1956).
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no claim is pending before the Board, it is not mandatory to file
the voluntary settlement agreement and receipts with the
Board.138 However, where there is a memorandum of agreement
under circumstances creating a duty in the employer to file
the agreement with the Board as a final settlement, it might
be held that the agreement was the'equivalent of an award.3 4
Nevertheless, where fraud is perpetrated, a claim may be re-
opened even though the agreement was not filed with the
Board. 35
842.270 [4932] Board hearing; application for; time and place of;
notice; informal conference with -parties. (1) If the parties fail to
reach an agreement in regard to compensation under this chapter,
or if they have previously filed such an agreement with the board
and compensation has been paid or is due in accordance therewith
and the parties thereafter disagree, either party may make written
application to the board for a hearing in regard to the matter at
issue and for a ruling thereon. Such application must be filed within
one year after the accident, or, in case of death, within one year after
such death, or within one year after the cessation of voluntary pay-
ments, if any have been made.
(2)As soon as possible after the application has been received
the board shall set the date for a hearing, to be held as soon as is
practicable in view of the matter involved, and shall notify the
parties at issue of the time and place of such hearing.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed to by the parties and authorized
by the board, the hearing shall be held at or convenient to the place
where the injury was sustained or the ground for disagreement
occurred. Before directing a hearing, the board, or a member thereof
or referee authorized by the board, may confer informally with the
parties at issue in an attempt to assist in adjusting their differences,
but may not delay the granting of a hearing, over the objection of
either party, for such purpose.
.This section has remained substantially unchanged from the
1916 Act. In the original Act the application for a hearing must
have been filed as soon as practicable after disagreement as to
133Fiorella v. Clark, 298 Ky. 817, 184 S.W. 2d 208 (1944); Langhorne &
Langhorne Co. v. Newsome, 285 Ky. 519, 148 S.W. 2d 684 (1941); Edgemont
Fuel Co. v. Patton, 256 Ky. 538, 76 S.W. 2d 284 (1934).
'3 4 Adldns v. International Harvester Co., 286 S.W. 2d 528 (Ky. 1956).
' 35 Low Moisture Coal Co. v. Vandiver, 260 S.W. 2d 395 (Ky. 1953).
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payment of compensation or after the cessation of voluntary
payments.136 In 1948 this section was changed and the entire
language pertaining to "after disagreement"'1 37 eliminated; now
the claim must be filed within one year after date of accident
or one year after death or the cessation of payments. The filing
of a claim within one year is mandatory as to time but merely
directory as to form.'38 Where the last day for filing falls on
Sunday or a legal holiday, the filing of the claim on the fol-
lowing day is too late. 3 9 However, where Saturday is the last
day for filing and the registered letter containing the applica-
tion would have been delivered to the Board on Saturday had
it been open, the petition was timely filed. 40 One year from
cessation of voluntary payments has been held by the Board to
be one year from date employee received last payment even
though payments cover an earlier period.'4 '
Before an employer is found to be estopped from pleading
the Statute of Limitations, there must be clear proof of estoppel.
.42
There has been considerable litigation on the question of
what are "voluntary payments." "Payments" as used in this sec-
tion mean payment of compensation' 43 and not payments of
medical expenses or doctor bills. 44 However, where the employee
believes that he is drawing voluntary payments, even though
the employer contends that these payments were gifts, the Court
of Appeals has ruled that these were voluntary payments.
45
842.275 [4933] Board hearing; when award to be made; record
filed; copy of award sent to parties. The board, or any of its mem-
bers, shall hear the parties at issue and their representatives and wit-
'a 6 Starks Realty Co. v. French, 267 Ky. 255, 101 S.W. 2d 946 (1937),
[subsequently overruled by the 1948 amendment]; Dosker, op. cit. supra note
119a at 529.
'37 See Laswell v. Carrollton Furniture Co., 251 S.W. 2d 296 (Ky. 1952).
'33 Mary Gail Coal Corp. v. Rhodes , 284 S.W. 2d 97 (Ky. 1955); also see
Charles v. Big Jim Coal Co., 237 S.W. 2d 68 (Ky. 1951); Manchester Coal Co.
v. Haynes, 305 Ky. 105, 212 S.W. 2d 315 (1947).
139 Inland Gas Co. v. Flint, 255 S.W. 2d 1006 (Ky. 1953).
140 Mary Gail Coal Co. v. Rhodes, 284 S.W. 2d 97 (Ky. 1955).
141 Mansfield v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co., W.C.B.D., #C-25528 (July 1,
1958).
142 Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Begley, 314 S.W. 2d 552 (1958); Buchanan v.
Buchanan Coal Co., 310 S.W. 2d 534 (Ky. 1958); Pipes Chevrolet Co. v. Bryant,
274 S.W. 2d 663 (Ky. 1954).
143 Miles v. General Electric Co., 280 S.W. 2d 529 (Ky. 1955).
144 Id. at 580.
145 American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. Crawford, 310 Ky. 711,
221 S.W. 2d 684 (1949).
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nesses and shall determine the dispute in a summary manner. The
award shall be made within thirty days after final submission, ex-
cept in cases involving large or complicated records or unusual ques-
tions of law, and shall be made within ninety days after final sub-
mission in any event. The award, together with a statement of the-
findings of fact, rulings of law and any other matters pertinent to the
question at issue shall be fied with the record of proceedings, and
a copy of the award shall immediately be sent to the parties in
dispute.
The original Act did not have any time limitation. The Board
attempts to expedite cases as much as possible. It is well estab-
lished that the Board's Findings of Fact (as contrasted with
Rulings of Law or pure questions of law) are conclusive if there
is competent evidence of probative value to support the facts.14
The Board must make separate findings of fact and rulings of
law as required by this section.147 The claimant has the burden
of proving by competent evidence all facts necessary to estab-
lish his claim. 4 ' However, upon the introduction of proof as to
coverage under the Act, the burden may shift.
149
342.280 [4934] Review by full board; cost of attendance of certain
witnesses. (1) If an application for review is made to the board
within fourteen days from the date of the award, the full board, if
the first hearing was not held before the full board, shall, as soon as
practicable, review the evidence, or, if deemed advisable, hear the
parties at issue, their representativs and witnesses, and shall make
an award and file it as specified in KRS 342.275.
(2) If a party introduces at a hearing before the full board a
witness whose testimony at the original hearing appears in the tran-
script of evidence taken thereat, the costs accruing through the at-
tendance of such witness and the transcribing of his testimony at
the second hearing shall be borne by the party introducing him at
that hearing, regardless of the outcome of the controversy.
The original Act of 1916 called for an appeal to the full Board
within seven days. By the 1950 amendment the appeal time was
146 Grisby v. Fraley 322 S.W. 2d 108 (Ky. 1959); Wells v. General Electric
Co., 318 S.W. 2d 865 (Ky. 1958); Salmon v. Armco Steel Corp., 275 S.W. 2d
590 (Ky. 1955); U. S. Coal & Coke Co. v. Lloyd, 305 Ky. 105, 203 S.W. 2d 47
(1947); Eastern Coal Corp. v. Thacker, 290 S.W. 2d 836 (Ky. 1956).
147 H. H. Wagner & Co. v. Moock, 303 Ky. 222, 197 S.W. 2d 254 (1946);
Wells v. General Electric Co. 318 S.W. 2d 865 (Ky. 1958).
148 Walker v. Lebanon Stone Co., 312 Ky. 624, 229 S.W. 2d 163 (1950).
149 Id at 163.
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extended to fourteen days. It is well established that the Board
acting in a quasi judicial capacity has control of cases pending
before it the same as a court until a final investigation of a con-
troversy on its merits, including the power to reconsider any of
its awards and to make appropriate action regardless of pre-
vious rulings.15° Once a final order is issued, however, the only
remedy of the aggrieved is appeal to the circuit court.15 The
time limitation for making an application for review to the
full Board is mandatory.5 2 By virtue of the Act the findings
of fact present and forseeable by the Board must be given greater
consideration by the Courts than a verdict of a jury.
153
842.285 [4935] Appeal to circuit court. (1) An award or order
of the board as provided in KRS 842.275, if application for review is
not fied as provided for in KRS 342.280, shall be conclusive and
binding as to all questions of fact, but either party may, within twenty
days after the rendition of such final award or order of the board,
by petition appeal to the circuit court that would have jurisdiction to
try an action for damages for the injuries if this chapter did not exist,
for the review of such order or award, the board and the adverse
party being made respondents.
153a
(2) The petition shall state fully the grounds upon which a re-
view is sought, assign all errors relied on and be verified by the peti-
tioner, who shall furnish copies of the petition to the respondents
at the time of filing it. Summons shall issue upon the petition direct-
ing the adverse party to file answer within fifteen days after service
thereof and directing the board to send its entire original record,
properly bound, to the clerk of the circuit court, after certifying that
such record is its entire original record, which shall be filed by the
clerk of the circuit court and such record shall then become and be
considered by the circuit court on review.
(3) No new additional evidence may be introduced in the cir-
cuit court except as to the fraud or misconduct of some person en-
gaged in the administration of this chapter and affecting the order,
ruling or award, but the court shall otherwise hear the cause upon
150 Sweeney v. Ky. State Highway Dept., 313 Ky. 503, 232 S.W. 2d 1018
(1950).
151 Washington v. Clover Fork Coal Co., 269 Ky. 604, 108 S.W. 2d 502
(1932).
152 Jones v. Davis, 246 Ky. 293, 54 S.W. 2d 681 (1932).
5 3 Frennie May Coal Co. v. Snow, 299 S.W. 2d 56 (Ky. 1950).
L53a Raley v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co., 317 S.W. 2d 900 (Ky. 1958);
U. S. Coal & Coke Co. v. Gilley, 296 Ky. 592, 177 S.W. 2d 877 (1944).
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the record as certified by the board and shall dispose of the cause
in summary manner, its review being limited to determining whether
or not:
(a) The board acted without or in excess of its powers;
(b) The order, decision or award was procured by fraud;
(c) The order, decision or award is not in conformity to the
provisions of this chapter; and
(d) If findings of fact are in issue, whether such findings of fact
support the order, decision or award.
(4) The board and each party may appear in such review pro-
ceedings; the court shall enter judgment affirming, modifying or
setting aside the order, decision or award, or in its discretion re-
manding the cause to the board for further proceedings in con-
formity with the direction of the court. The court may, before judg-
ment and upon a sufficient showing of fact, remand the cause to the
board.
This section has remained substantially as written into the
1916 Act except as to the manner in which the record is tendered
to the circuit court. As the section now reads the Board shall
send "its entire record, properly bound, to the clerk of the cir-
cuit court, after certifying that such record is its entire original
record," and "which shall be filed by the clerk of the circuit
court" to be considered by the circuit court on review.154 The
twenty days allowed for filing a petition for review are com-
puted from the active rendition of the award and not from the
day of the award, and hence, the day the award was entered
must be included in the twenty days.15
The circuit court is an intermediate appellate court in work-
men's compensation cases and no new or additional evidence
may be introduced in that court except as to fraud or miscon-
duct of some person engaged in the administration of the Act.5 "
Construction of the statute, pure questions of law, and cases
of no issue of fact are' all fully reviewable on appeal to the
courts. 57
The orders that a circuit court may issue to the Board are
limited.158 The function of the circuit courts and the Court of
154 1948 amendment.
155 Webb v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 303 Ky. 152, 197 S.W. 2d 90 (1946).
156 Harvey Coal Corp. v. Morris, 237 S.W. 2d 70 (Ky. 1951).
157 Childers v. Stephenson, 320 S.W. 2d 797 (Ky. 1959); Combs v. Gaffney,
282 S.W. 2d 817 (Ky. 1955).
158 See Columbus Mining Co. v. Pelfrey, 237 S.W. 2d 847 (Ky. 1951); Hen-
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Appeals on cases appealed from the Workmen's Compensation
Board as to the facts is to review the record to determine whether
or not the findings of the Board are supported by any evidence of
probative value. 159 It has been held that directions by the cir-
cuit court limiting a case, after setting aside a Board's order
denying an employer's motion to reopen, to hearing the parties
and determining whether the claimant is entitled to any com-
pensation payment for a certain period, is too broad since the
court should have remanded the case with directions for the
Board to take jurisdiction and to hear the motion of its merits
with proceedings consistent therewith.60
842.290 [4936] Appeal to Court of Appeals. (1) Where an amount
sufficient under KRS 21.060 to authorize an appeal to the Court
of Appeals is involved, the judgment of the circuit court shall be
subject to appeal to the Court of Appeals. The scope of review by
the Court of Appeals shall include all matters subject to review by
the circuit courtooa and also errors of law arising in the circuit court
and upon appeal made reviewable by the Civil Code of procedure
where not in conflict with this chapter.
(2) The procedure as to appeal to the Court of Appeals shall
be the same as in civil actions, so far as it is applicable to and not
in conflict with this chapter, except as follows:
The appellant shall file with the clerk of the circuit court, to-
gether with proof or acknowledgment of service, a schedule which
indicates the portions of the record to be incorporated into the tran-
script of the record to be used on appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Should the appellee or his counsel desire additional portions of the
record incorporated into the record to be filed in the Court of Ap-
peals, he may file with the clerk of the circuit court his schedule also
within ten days thereafter (unless the time is extended by order of
the circuit court or the Court of Appeals), indicating the additional
portions of the record desired by him. Provided, however, that if the
original record of the Workmen's Compensation Board is desired by
either party on appeal to the Court of Appeals, it shall not be neces-
dricks v. Ky. & Va. Leaf Tobacco Co., 312 Ky. 849, 229 S.W. 2d 953 (1950);
H. H. Wagner & Co. v. Moock, 803 Ky. 222, 197 S.W. 2d 254 (Ky. 1946).
159 Grisby v. Fraley 322 S.W. 2d 108 (Ky. 1959); Wells v. General
Electric Co., 318 S.W. 2d 965 (Ky. 1958); Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Adams, 313
S.W. 2d 421 (Ky. 1958); Homer Brown Coal Co. v. Mays, 307 S.W. 2d 934
(Ky. 1957); Tyler-Couch Construction Co. v. Elmore, 264 S.W. 2d 56 (Ky. 1954).
160 Oldham v. Officers' Club of Fort Knox, 244, S.W. 2d 478 (Ky. 1951).
1L60a Childers v. Stephenson, 320 S.W. 2d 797 (Ky. 1959).
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sary for the clerk of the circuit court to copy said original record
into the transcript, but the same shall be and become a part of the
transcript and shall be forwarded to the Clerk of the Court of Ap-
peals as a part of the record upon appeal to said court. The clerk
shall not be entitled to any transcript fee for such original record.
(3) The clerk of the circuit court will transmit to the Court of
Appeals as the transcript of the record only those portions of the record
of the lower court as are designated by the parties as above.
Prior to 1948 this section remained substantially unchanged
from the original Act of 1916. The 1948 amendments extensively
changed the method for appeals to the Court of Appeals, thereby
expediting this action. Where the total amount claimed is less
than $2,000, the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction of appeal
in absence of a motion for appeal.'' An order of the circuit
court remanding a case back to the Board is appealable as a
final order.6
2
842.295 [4937] Safekeeping, transporting and return of original
record of board. The Circuit Court of the Court of Appeals may make
such rule or order as it may deem necessary for the safekeeping,
transporting and return of such original records of the Workmen's
Compensation Board to the said board when the judgment in the
case becomes final, provided that a copy of the final judgment shall
be returnd with each record. When any appeal has become final the
Clerk of the Court of Appeals shall return such original record to
the Workmen's Compensation Board, who shall safely keep the same.
At all times thereafter such record shall remain a part of the record
of the case in the Court of Appeals, though kept in the possession
of the Workmen's Compensation Board.163
This section remained unchanged from the original Act until
1948 when the present general procedure was adopted. However,
in 1954, the General Assembly added the clause following the
words "becomes final."
The original Act did not provide for the suspension of the
'61 Woolsey v. Price Chemical Co., 807 S.W. 2d 572 (Ky. 1957); also see
Johnson v. McCoy's Admr., 284 S.W. 2d 676 (Ky. 1955).
162 Mullins v. Ky.-W. Va. Gas Co., 307 S.W. 2d 169 (Ky. 1957); but see Green
River Fuel Co. v. Sutton, 260 Ky. 288, 84 S.W. 2d 79 (1985), where it was held
that an order of the circuit court remanding a case back to the Board without
passing on the merits, with directions to make an award in compliance with the
statute with separate findings of law and fact held to, be interlocutory, not a
"final order," hence not appealable.
163 Cornett-Lewis Coal Co. v. Day, 312 Ky. 221, 226 S.W. 2d 951 (1950).
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award, order or judgment upon the execution by the adverse
party of a supersedes bond. The suspension provision was en-
acted by the 1926 legislature.16 4
842.800 [4938] Continuation of award pending appeal. Upon
motion of either party and a sufficient showing of reason and neces-
sity therefor, the circuit court to which an appeal is taken may con-
tinue in force the award, judgment, or order appealed from, pend-
ing its decision of such appeal, but to be suspended upon the ex-
ecution by the adverse party of a supersedeas bond for appeal to
the Court of Appeals.
Proceedings for the enforcement of an agreement that has
become an award of the Board must be had in circuit court,
165
as the Board has no enforcement powers. An award is in the
nature of a judgment and rights acquired under it cannot be
destroyed by a refusal to recognize it.166 The procedure out-
lined in this section is to be had only when the order of the Board
has become final. 67
842.805 [4939] Enforcement by circuit court of agreement or award.
Any party in interest may file in the circuit court of the county in
which the injury occurred a certified copy of a memorandum of agree-
ment approved by the board or of an order or decision of the board,
or of an award of the board unappealed from, or of an award of
the board rendered upon an appeal. The court shall render judg-
ment in accordance therewith and notify the parties. Such judg-
ment shall have the same effect, and all proceedings in relation
thereto shall thereafter be the same as though it had been rendered
in a suit duly heard and determined by that court. Any such judg-
ment, unappealed from or affirmed on appeal or modified in obedi-
ence to the mandate of the Court of Appeals shall be modified to
conform to any decision of the board ending, diminishing or increas-
ing any weekly payment under the provisions of KRS 342.125 upon
a presentation to it of a certified copy of such decision.
Except for the changing of the words "appellate court" to
"Court of Appeals" this section has remained exactly as written
in the original Act.
164 Dosker, op. cit. supra note 119a at T81.
165 See Cornwell v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 304 Ky. 182, 200 S.W. 2d
286 (1947).
166 Id. at 287.
167 Owensboro Wagon Co. v. Adams, 809 Ky. 802, 216 S.W. 2d 637 (1949).
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The sole purpose of this section is to enforce the agreement
approved by the Board or order, decision or award of the Board
if unappealed from, or affirmed on appeal.168
842.310 [4940] Court may assess cost of unreasonable proceedings.
If the board or any court before whom any proceeedings are brought
under this chapter determines that such proceedings have been
brought, prosecuted or defended without reasonable ground, it may
assess the whole cost of the proceedings upon the party who has
so brought, prosecuted or defended them.
This section has remained unchanged since the original Act.
The assessment of the whole costs referred to in this section
applies exclusively to proceedings before the Board and has no
reference to costs growing out of common law actions wholly out-
side of and independent of any of the Act's provisions. 169
342.815 [4941] Appointment of physicians to examine claimant
employe; compensation and expenses of examination. (1) The board,
or any member thereof, may, upon the application of either party
or upon its own motion, appoint not more than three disinterested
and duly qualified physicians or surgeons to make any necessary
medical examination of the employe and to testify in respect thereto.
Such physicians or surgeons shall file with the board within fifteen
days after such examination their joint report in writing. The physi-
cians or surgeons shall be allowed a reasonable fee to be fixed by
the board and paid out of the Maintenance Fund, not exceeding
seventy-five dollars for each examination and report, except that the
board may allow additional reasonable amounts in extraordinary
cases and the reasonable cost of X-rays, if any; the board may in its
discretion allow a fee not in excess of twenty-five dollars for any
deposition given by such physicians or surgeons.
(2) The party filing the motion for an examination shall pay the
necessary and reasonable traveling expenses incurred by the em-
ploye in submitting to such examination. If the examination is or-
dered on the board's own motion, then such traveling expenses shall
be paid out of the Maintenance Fund.
16sStearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Duncan, 271 Ky. 800, 113 S.W. 2d 486
(1938).
169 Beattyville Co. v. Sizemore, 203 Ky. 7, 261, S.W. 2d 620 (1924).
[Vol. 47,
KENTUCKY WOPm1IEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
The basic structure of this section was contained in the
original Act which provided for the appointment of one disinter-
ested physician or surgeon, allowing him traveling expenses and
a reasonable fee not to exceed $10.00 except in extraordinary
cases.
By the 1944 amendment in addition to raising the physician's
or surgeon's fee to $15.00, the amendment provided for the
appointment of a medical committee composed of three dis-
interested physicians with experience to diagnose and treat
occupational diseases including silicosis, two of whom were to
be qualified radiologists. Claims for silicosis were to be referred
to this committee who were to examine the employees and
certify their findings to the Board covering the stage, if any, of
the silicosis, whether the disability was temporary partial or total,
and the extent, if any, of impairment of capacity to work.
By an amendment in 1946 the 1944 amendment pertaining to
the medical committee was repealed. In 1946 the following
amendment was added:
Upon the application of either party such appointment
shall be made in any case where the amount of compen-
sation claimed or reasonably to be anticipated exceeds
the sum of $200.00.
By amendment of 1948 the $200.00 limitation was removed.
The following change was also enacted in 1948:
except that the Board may allow additional reasonable
amounts in extraordinary cases and the reasonable costs of
x-rays, if any;
By the 1950 amendment the Board could in its discretion
allow a fee not in excess of $10.00 for any deposition given by
such disinterested physician or surgeon. The 1956 amendment
raised the number of disinterested physicians that could be ap-
pointed from one to three and required that said physicians file
with the Board within fifteen days after their examination a
written joint report of their findings.
The amendment further provided that the fees to be fixed
by the Board could not exceed $75.00 for each examination,
also raised the amount to be allowed for depositions not to ex-
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ceed $25.00 in the Board's discretion. Section (2) relating to
necessary and reasonable traveling expenses to the employee
submitting to the examination was also added by the 1956
amendment.
The depositions of the disinterested physician or physicians,
of course, can be taken, and usually are, by the Board with the
right of the patries to cross-examine. Although there is no direct
provision in this section for the taking of the disinterested
physician's deposition, such authority is found in KRS 842.280.
See Tackett v. Eastern Coal Corp., 295 Ky. 422, 174 S.W. 2d
707 (1948); Mills v. Casner, 296 Ky. 678, 178 S.W. 2d 196 (1944).
842.816 Occupational disease; defined; claim and allowance of
compensation for. (1) "Occupational Disease" as used in this chapter
means a disease arising out of and in the course of the employment.
Ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is equally ex-
posed outside of the employment shall not be compensable, except
where such diseases follow as an incident of an occupational dis-
ease as defined in this section.
(a) A disease shall be deemed to arise out of the employment only
if there is apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all
the circumstances, a direct causal connection between the condi-
tions under which the work is performed and the occupational dis-
ease, and which can be seen to have followed as a natural incident
of the work as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of
the employment and which can be fairly traced to the employment
as the proximate cause, and which does not come from a hazard
to which workmen would have been equally exposed outside of the
employment. The disease shall be incidental to the character of the
business and not independent of the relationship of employer and
employe. The disease need not have been foreseen or expected but,
after its contraction, it must appear to have had its origin in a risk
connected with the employment and to have flowed from that
source as a rational consequence.
(b) "Injurious exposure" as used in this section shall mean that
exposure to occupational hazard which would, independently of any
other cause whatsoever produce or cause the disease for which
claim is made.
(2) The procedure with respect to the giving of notice of dis-
ability or death, and as to the filing of claims and determination
thereof in occupational disease cases and the compensation and
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medical benefits payable for disability or death due to such disease
shall be the same as in cases of accidental injury or death under
the general provisions of this chapter, except that notice of dis-
ability shall be given to the employer as soon as practicable after
the employe first experiences a distinct manifestation of an occupa-
tional disease in the form of symptoms reasonably sufficient to apprise
him that he has contracted such disease, or a diagnosis of such
disease is first communicated to him, whichever shall first occur.
(3) The right to compensation under this chapter for disability
resulting from an occupational disease shall be forever barred un-
less a claim is filed with the Workien's Compensation Board within
one year after the last injurious exposure to the occupational hazard
or after the employe first experiences a distinct manifestation of an
occupational disease in the form of symptoms reasonably sufficient
to apprise him that he has contracted the disease, whichever shall
last occur; and if death results from the occupational disease within
said period, unless a claim therefor be filed with the Workmen's
Compensation Board within one year after such death; provided,
however, that notice of such claim shall be deemed waived in case
of disability or death where the employer, or his insurance carrier,
voluntarily makes payment therefor, or, if the incurrence of the dis-
ease or the death of the employe, and its cause was known to the
employer; and provided further, that where compensation has been
paid or awarded, whether for disability or death from an occupational
disease, and the payments have been discontinued, the claim' for
further compensation shall be made within one year after the last pay-
ment of compensation.
(4) In claims for compensation due to the occupational disease
of silicosis it must be shown that the employe was exposed to the
hazards of the disease in his employment within this state for at
least two years before his disability or death.
(5) The amount of compensation payable for disability due to
occupational disease or for death from such disease, and the time
and manner of its payment, shall be the same as provided for acci-
dental injury or death under the general provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, but in no event to exceed such amounts, and,
provided further, that the time of the beginning of compensation
payments shall be the date of the employe's last injurious exposure
to the cause of the disease, or the date of actual disability, whichever
is later, and provided further, that in case of death where the em-
ploye has been awarded compensation or made timely claim within
the period provided for in this section, an employe has suffered con-
tinuous disability to the date of his death occurring at any time within
1959]
KENTUcKY LAw JouRNAL
ten years from the date of disability, his dependents, if any, shall
be awarded compensation for his death as provided for under the
general provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and in this
section.
(6) In case of disability or death from silicosis, an occupational
disease, complicated with tuberculosis of the lungs, compensation
shall be payable as for uncomplicated silicosis, provided, however,
that silicosis was an essential factor in causing such disability or
death.
(7) If an autopsy has been performed, no testimony relative
thereto shall be competent unless the employer or his representative
and a representative of the deaceasd employe shall have participated
therein or been given reasonable opportunity to do so.
(8) No compensation shall be payable for occupational disease
if the employe at the time of entering the employment of the em-
ployer by whom compensation would otherwise be payable, falsely
represented himself, in writing, as not having been previously dis-
abled, laid off, or compensated in damages or otherwise, because
of such disease, or failed or omitted truthfully to state to the best
of his knowledge, in answer to written inquiry made by the em-
ployer, the place, duration and nature of previous employment, or,
to the best of his knowledge, the previous state of his health.
(9) Where an occupational disease is aggravated by other dis-
ease or infirmity not itself compensable, or where disability or death
from any other cause, not itself compensable is aggravated, prolonged,
accelerated or in anywise contributed to by occupational disease the
compensation payable shall be reduced and limited to such propor-
tion only of the compensation that would be payable if the occupa-
tional disease were the sole cause of the disability or death as such
occupational disease, as a causative factor, bears to all causes of
such disability or death, such reduction in compensation to be
affected by reducing the number of weekly or monthly payments or
the amount of such payments as under the circumstances of the
particular case may be for the best interests of the claimant or
claimants.
(10) No compensation for death from occupational disease shall
be payable to any person whose relationship to the deceased, which,
under the provisions of this chapter would give right to compensa-
tion arose, subsequent to the beginning of the first compensable dis-
ability, save only to after-born children of a marriage existing at
the beginning of such disability.
(11) Whenever any claimant misconceives his remedy and files
an application for adjustment of claim under the general provisions
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of this chapter and it is subsequently discovered, at any time before
the final disposition of such cause, that the claim for injury, disability
or death which was the basis for such application should properly
have been made under the provisions of this section, then the ap-
plication so filed may be amended in form or substance, or both,
to assert a claim for such injury, disability or death under the pro-
visions of this section, and it shall be deemed to have been so filed
as amended on the date of the original filing thereof, and such com-
pensation may be awarded as is warranted by the whole evidence
pursuant to the provisions of this chapter. When such amendment
is submitted, further or additional evidence may be heard by the
board when deemed necessary. Nothing this section contains shall
be construed to be or permit a waiver of any of the provisions of this
chapter with reference to notice of time for filing a claim, but notice
of filing a claim, if given or done, shall be deemed to be a notice
of filing of a claim under provisions of this chapter, if given or done
within the time required herein.
(12) When an employe has an occupational disease that is cov-
ered by this chapter, the employer in whose employment he was
last injuriously exposed to the hazard of the disease, and the em-
ployer's insurance carrier, if any, at the time of the exposure, shall
alone be liable therefor, without right to contribution from any prior
employer or insurance carrier.
The original Act contained no provisions allowing recovery
for any occupational diseases, not even for silicosis. In 1924 dis-
ability from noxious gases, smoke or bad air was made compen-
sable as set out in the present KRS 342.005.170
Although the predecessor of the present section was first
enacted in 1944, as discussed infra, by amendment of 1934 to
KRS 342.005 employers and their employees engaged in the
operation of glass manufacturing plants, quarries, sand mines
or in the manufacturing, treating or handling of sand could, with
respect to the disease of silicosis caused by the inhalation of silica
dust, voluntarily by joint application subject themselves to the
Act as to such disease.
By amendment in 1944 section KRS 342.005 was enlarged
to include "any employers and their employees" and KRS
42.316 was first enacted.
The predecessor of the present section when first enacted in
1944 provided among other things that the section would not
170 Dosker, Workmen's Compensation Law in Kentucky 91 (1st ed. 1916).
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apply to cases of silicosis in which the last injurious exposure
to the hazards of such disease occurred before March 20, 1944.171
It also provided for the appointment of a medical committee to
examine and pass upon silicosis claims. 2
In 1948 the section was considerably changed as to pro-
cedure for recovery and eliminated the medical committee here-
tofore discussed in KRS 342.315 (See General Refractories Co.,
Inc. v. Henderson, 813 Ky. 613,232 S.W. 2d 846 (1950), as to con-
stitutionality when applying change to pending cases.
In 1956 this section was given its present form and became
what is now commonly referred to as the Occupational Disease
Act, and, although there are still some references directly to the
occupational disease of silicosis, 17 3 in contrast to occupational
disease in general, the disease of silicosis is treated, except where
specifically otherwise provided, as an occupational disease as
defined in this section.
The requirement of a joint application for election for cov-
erage with respect to silicosis as formerly required by KRS
342.005174 was eliminated by the 1956 amendment.
The Court of Appeals has not to date decided any cases based
on the 1956 amendments of this section.
Where disability is claimed from silicosis the Board must
first determine whether or not the claimant has silicosis before
it considers the question of injurious exposure.175 The degree
of proof necessary for injurious exposure to free silica dust is con-
siderably limited, it not being necessary to prove exposure by
a high degree of scientific proof or technical requirements,'76
and if the disease is shown to exist, the question of exposure
to the to the hazard will be determined in the light of that fact.'
The 60-day exposure period as set out in the 1948 amend-
ment KRS 342.316(3) was eliminated by the 1956 amendment.
For an interpretation of this section prior to its deletion see
Jones v. Crummies Creek Coal Co., 264 S.W. 2d 295 (Ky. 1954).
171 KRS 342.316(5)-1944 Act.
172 KRS 342.816(10), (11), (12), (13)-1944 Act.
173KRS 342.316(4) and (6).
174See discussion under KRS 342.005.
175Kinker v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 268 S.W. 2d 948
(Ky. 1954).
176 Jones v. Crummies Creek Coal Co., 264 S.W. 2d 294 (Ky. 1954); Robin-
son v. Peabody Coal Co., 273 S.W. 2d 573 (Ky. 1954); U. S. Steel Co. v. Lock-
hart, 261 S.W. 2d 643 (Ky. 1953)
177 U. S. Coal & Coke Co. v. Hooks, 286 S.W. 2d 919 (Ky. 1956).
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The purpose of the provision of this Act requiring a claim-
ant to show that he has been exposed in his employment to the
hazards of silicosis within this state for two years before its dis-
ability or death was to afford employers protection against
claims of migrant workers and those who have incurred the
disease in employment outside the state,17 but it is not neces-
sary to specify how frequent or how intense the exposure was dur-
ing the two year period."7
Notice of disability must be given to the employer as soon
as practicable after the employee "first experiences a distinct
manifestation of an occupational disease in the form of symptoms
reasonably sufficient to appraise him that he has contracted such
disease or a diagnosis of such disease if first communicated to
him, whichever shall first occur."18°
In case of death or disability from silicosis complicated with
tuberculosis of the lungs, compensation shall be payable as for
uncomplicated silicosis if the silicosis was an essential factor in
causing such disability or death, it not being necessary to appor-
tion between the two disabling causes. 18'
Prior to the 1956 amendment to KRS 342.005(2), which
eliminated the requirement of a joint election by the employer
and the employee before the coverage of silicosis became oper-
ative, it was held that where the employer obligated himself
under a collective bargaining agreement to comply with the Act,
even though there had been no formal acceptance of the silicosis
section, as a matter of law the employee was covered.1
8 2
Where compensation has been paid or awarded either for
disability or death from an occupational disease, and the pay-
ments have been discontinued, the claim for further compen-
sation shall be made within one year after the last payment of
compensation; 183 this section circumscribes the provisions of
YRS 342.125.184
178 Mary Helen Coal Corp. v. Parrott, 290 S.W. 2d 477 (Ky. 1956).
179 Id. at 478.
180 KRS 342.316(2); Inland Steel Co. v. Byrd 316 S.W. 2d 215 (Ky. 1958);
Llewellyn v. Peabody Coal Co., 306 S.W. 2d 262 (Ky. 1957); Harlan Fuel Co. v.
Burkhart, 296 S.W. 2d 722 (Ky. 1956); Deal v. U. S. Steel Corp., 296 S.W. 2d
724 (Ky. 1956); U. S. Steel Corp. v. Birchfield, 296 S.W. 2d 796 (Ky. 1956).
181 KS 842.316(6); Pond Creek Colliery v. Taylor, 302 S.W. 2d 838 (Ky.
1957).
182 Dick v. International Harvester Co., 310 S.W. 2d 514 (Ky. 1958).
183 KRS 342.316(3).
184 Harvey Coal Co. v. Caldwell, 313 S.W. 2d 274 (Ky. 1958); see discus-
sion under KRS 342.125 supra.
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842.820 [4942] Regulation of charges by attorneys, physicians and
hospitals. (1) All fees of attorneys and physicians, and all charges
of hospitals under this chapter, shall be subject to the approval of
the board. No attorney fees shall be allowed or approved against
any party not represented by said attorney, nor shall any attorney
fee be allowed or approved exceeding an amount equal to twenty
percent of the amount recovered. The board may reduce the at-
torney's fee to an amount commensurate with the services performed,
or may deny or reduce an attorney's fee upon proof of solicitation
of employment.
(2) The entire attorney's fee in a lump sum shall be paid directly
to the attorney of record, and the board in allowing or approving
an attorney's fee, as provided in this section, shall order the pay-
ment of same directly to the attorney, commuting sufficient of the
final payments of compensation payable under the award to a lump
sum for that purpose.
The provision for attorneys' fees of 15% of the first $1,000.00
or fraction thereof recovered and 10% thereafter, with the dis-
cretion of the Board to deny or reduce attorneys' fees, remained
unchanged from the original enactment of 1916 as repealed and
re-enacted by the 1926 Assembly, until 1952.1s- In 1952 the section
was changed to provide that the attorney representing claimants
under this Act "shall receive as his fee, a sum up to 25% of the
award to his client, one-half of which shall be paid out of the
award and one-half to be paid by the employer," with the Board
still having the discretion to deny or reduce attorneys' fees.
The 1952 amendment was declared unconstitutional"' on
the ground that it was a violation of the due process clause of
the federal and state constitutions. Since an unconstitutional
law cannot supersede an existing valid law, the previous KRS
342.320 was still valid.18
7
By the 1956 amendment the attorneys' fees were raised to
20% of the amount recovered, with the Board still maintaining
discretion to reduce or deny attorneys' fees.
Determination of the amount of attorneys' fees is not a sub-
stantive matter, but rather is procedural, 8 and is to be deter-
185 Dosker, Workmen's Compensation in Kentucky 274 (1st ed. 1916).
186 Burns v. Shepherd, 264 S.W. 2d 685 (Ky. 1954).
187 Id., at 688.
188 Rye v. Conkwright, 811 S.W. 2d 796 (Ky. 1958).
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mined after a linal determination of the claim, with the statute
applicable at that time determining the amount of the claim
and the reasonableness of the fee. s8
Charging fees in violation of this section has been ground
for suspension from the practice of law until restitution of alleged
excessive fee charged or unless a declaratory judgment was ob-
tained adjudging attorney not be indebted to claimant.190
If the Board finds in its sound discretion after careful con-
sideration of the facts and circumstances that a fee should be
reduced, it may reduce it, even though the contract fee agreed
to does not exceed the statutory amount and there is no evidence
that the employment was solicited.'91
842.825 [4943] Questions not agreed on determined by board. All
questions arising under this chapter, if not settled by agreement of
the parties interested therein, with the approval of the board, shall
be determined by the board except as otherwise provided in this
chapter.
This section has remained unchanged from the original Act
of 1916. It is for the Board to determine whether there was a
valid outstanding policy issued by an insurance carrier and
covered by claimant's employer at time of claimant's injury.
192
A Federal district court would not take jurisdiction of a
declaratory judgment suit where an insurer under the Act sought
a declaration of rights as to its liability, because such a declar-
ation of rights went to the merits of the case, and there existed
a legal question which should have been determined by the
Workmen's Compensation Board. 9 '
842.830 [4944] Employes record of injuries; reports to board;
contents of. (1) Every employer subject to this chapter shall keep
a record of all injuries fatal .or otherwise, received by his employes
in the course of their employment. Within one week after the oc-
189 Id., at 198.
10 In re Charles H. Whittle, 288 S.W. 2d 337 (Ky. 1956), where a declar-
atory judgment was filed but never processed.
'O'R1awlings v. Workmen's Compensation Board, 187 Ky. 308, 218 S.W. 32
(1920), but see Vanderpool v. Goosecreek Mining Co., 170 S.W. 2d 32 (Ky.
1943).
192 Lawrence Coal Co. v. Boggs, 309 Ky. 646, 218 S.W. 2d 670 (1949).
193 Coal Operators Casualty Co. v. Abshire, 111 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Ky. 1953).
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currence and knowledge, as provided in KRS 842.185 to 842.200, of
an injury to an employe causing his absence from work for more
than one day, a report thereof shall be made in writing and mailed
to the board on blanks procured from the board for the purpose.
(2) Upon the termination of the disability of the injured em-
ploye, or if the disability extends beyond a period of sixty days, then
also at the expiration of such period the employer shall make a sup-
plementary report to the board on blanks procured from the board
for the purpose.
(3) The report shall contain the name, nature and location of the
business of the employer and name, age, sex, wages and occupation
of the injured employe, and shall state the date and hour of the acci-
dent causing the injury, the nature and cause of the injury, and any
other information required by the board.
This section has remained unchanged from the original Act
of 1916.
The penalty for violation of this section is a fine of not more
than $25.00 for each offense.1 4 However, failure of the em-
ployer to report the accident does not estop him from relying
on other provisions of the Act, 9 5 including one year limitation
period.' 0
842.885 [4945] No person to misrepresent or defraud; present false
claim. No person shall knowingly file, or permit to be filed any false
or fraudulent claim on his behalf to compensation or other benefits
under this chapter, or by fraud, deceit or misrepresentation procure
or cause to be made or receive any payments of compensation or
other benefits under this chapter to which the recipient is not law-
fully entitled, or conspire with, aid or abet another so to do. No
person shall by deceit or misrepresentation or with intent to defraud
cause or procure or conspire with, aid or abet another in so causing
or procuring any person entitled to compensation or other benefits
under this chapter to omit to claim title thereto or to accept the pay-
ment of a less sum than that to which he may be lawfully entitled
to thereunder.
This section has remained unchanged from the 1916 Act
except the original Act declared such violation to be a misde-
194 KRS 342.990(1).
195Langhorne & Langhorne v. Newsome, 285 Ky. 519, 148 S.W. 2d 684
(1941).
196 Fiorella v. Clark, 298 Ky. 817, 184 S.W. 2d 208 (1944).
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meanor. Subsequently the words "shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor" were eliminated, although the penalties for violations
as set out in the original Act have remained unchanged.
97
842.340 [4946] Employer to insure or provide security against lia-
bility to workers. (1) Every employer under this chapter shall either
insure and keep insured his liability for compensation hereunder in
some corporation, association or organization authorized to transact
the business of workmen's compensation insurance in this state or
shall furnish to the board satisfactory proof of his financial ability to
pay directly the compensation in the amount and manner and when
due as provided for in this chapter. In the latter case the board shall
require the deposit of an acceptable security, indemnity or bond
to secure to such an extent as the board directs the payment of com-
pensation liabilities as they are incurred.
(2) Every employer accepting this chapter shall at the time of
such acceptance fie with the board in substantially the form pre-
scribed by it, and annually thereafter, or as often as may be neces-
sary, evidence of his compliance with the provisions of this section
and all others relating thereto. Until these provisions are complied
with the employer shall, from the date of his acceptance of the chap-
ter, be liable to an employe either for compensation under this chapter
or at law in the same manner as if the employer had refused to ac-
cept this chapter. Claim of compensation in such cases shall be con-
sidered a waiver of the right to proceed at law and the institution of
an action at law shall be considered a waiver of all claim to com-
pensation.
This section has remained unchanged from the original Act of
1916. Where coverage of an employer's policy was limited to
business of servicing and selling automobiles, even though that
class of risk included garage helpers, the policy did not cover
liability for employee's death while said employee was operat-
ing a taxicab also owned by the employer. 9 Where an em-
ployer is operating one business and the employee was only
temporarily outside his accustomed work recovery may be had. 99
.97 KRS 342.990(2).
198 Old Republic Inc. Co. v. Begley, 814 S.W. 2d 552 (Ky. 1958); also see
KRS 842.375; Aetna v. City of Henderson, 14 S.W. 2d 211 (Ky. 1929); City of
Henderson v. Royal Indemnity Co., 227 Ky. 746, 14 S.W. 2d 213 (1929); Kelly
v. Nussbaum, 218 Ky. 330, 291 S.W. 2d 754 (1927). Also see comment on the
Begley case, supra, 47 Ky. L. J. 267 (1959).99 Nugent Sand Co. v. Harshegimer, 254 Ky. 38, 71 S.W. 2d 647 (1934).
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842.845 [4947] Certificate of self-insurance; revocation; new cer-
tificate; independent insurance of risk; (1) Whenever an employer
has complied with the provisions of KRS 342.340 relating to self-in-
surance, the board shall issue to such employer a certificate which
shall remain in force for a period fixed by the board. But the board
may, upon at least sixty days' notice and a hearing to the employer,
revoke the certificate upon satisfactory evidence for such revocation
having been presented. The board may thereafter, upon petition of
the employer and a hearing, grant a new certificate, but the employer
shall not, as a matter of right, be entitled to a hearing for this pur-
pose sooner than six months after a previous revocation of his cer-
tificate.
842.850 [4948] Mutual or interinsurance against compensation
claims; board may require reinsurance. (1) In order to comply with
KRS 342.340 groups of employers may form, either among them-
selves or with employers in other states, mutual insurance associ-
ations or reciprocal or interinsurance exchanges subject to the insur-
ance laws of this state and such reasonable conditions and restrictions
not inconsistent therewith as may be fixed by the board. Membership in
such mutual insurance associations or reciprocal or interinsurance
exchanges so approved, together with evidence of the payment of
premiums due, shall be evidence of compliance with KRS 42.340.
(2) The board may, except as provided in subsection (3), re-
quire any mutual insurance association or reciprocal or interinsur-
ance exchange to purchase an annuity or to effect reinsurance with
a company authorized to transact insurance in this state or to make
such deposit with a bank or trust company of this state as shall in
either case be approved by the board for the purpose of fully secur-
ing the payment of all deferred installments upon any claim for com-
pensation.
(3) Any mutual insurance association or reciprocal or inter-
insurance exchange possessing a surplus of at least one hundred
thousand dollars and not less in amount than the capital required
of a domestic stock insurance company transacting the same kind
of insurance, shall not be required to purchase an annuity or effect
reinsurance with a company authorized to transact insurance in this
state or to make such a deposit with a bank or trust company of this
state for the purpose of fully securing the payment of all deferred in-
stallments upon any claim for compensation.
Sections 342.345-342.380 concern certificates of self-insurers
and other matters pertaining to insurance and coverage and types
[Vol. 47,
KENTUCKY WOR-MEN'S CO-MPENSATION LAW
of policies. Since this article primarily concerns sections of the
Act directly covering compensable injuries, a full discussion of
the provisions in these sections will be reserved for a subsequent
article.
842.390 [4956] Employer's notice of election to operate under this
chapter; evidence of election. (1) Election to operate under this
chapter shall be effected by the employer by iing with the board
the following notice:
"(Name of employer) elects to operate under the Workmen's
Compensation Law (KRS Chapter 342). This election is effective as
of the day of ... and covering (here insert name of industry, busi-
ness or operation on which election is made.)"
(2) In addition to the name of each industry, business or op-
eration as to which such election is filed there shall also be stated
in the notice with reference thereto:
(a) Its location and address of chief office;
(b) Average number of employes during preceding twelve months;
(c) Kind of business being conducted; and
(d) Method of securing payments of compensation to employes
that the employer elects to adopt.
(3)The notice shall be in writing signed by the employer, if an
individual, by any partner, if a partnership; or by the chief officer
or agent within this state, if a corporation.
(4) The notice or a copy thereof certified by an authorized repre-
sentative of the board may be used as evidence in any action by or
against the employer in any court of this state of the facts therein
shown and that the employer has elected to operate under this
chapter.
842.895 [4957] Employe deemed to have accepted provisions of
chapter unless contrary notice given to employer; withdrawal of elec-
tion to reject chapter. In the event an employer elects to operate
under this chapter, then every employe of such employer, as a part
of his contract of hiring or who may be employed at the time of the
acceptance of the provisions of this chapter by such employer, shall
be deemed to have accepted all the provisions of this chapter and
shall be bound thereby unless he shall have filed, prior to the injury
or incurrence of occupational disease, written notice to the contrary
with the employer; and such acceptance shall include all of the pro-
visions of this chapter with respect to traumatic personal injury, sili-
cosis and any other occupational disease.
Until such notice to the contrary is so given to the employer,
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the measure of liability of such employer shall be determined ac-
cording to the compensation provisions of this chapter.ls 9a Any such
employe, may, without prejudice to any existing right or claim, with-
draw his election to reject this chapter by filing with the employer a
written notice of withdrawal, stated the date when the withdrawal is
to become effective. Following the filing of such notice, the status
of the party withdrawing shall become the same as if the former elec-
tion to reject this chapter had not been made, except that with-
drawal shall not be effective as to any injury sustained or disease
incurred less than one week after the notice is filed.
These sections are considered together because the problems
presented are interwoven.
Except for minor grammatical changes KRS 342.390 has re-
mained as written in the original Act. KRS 342.395 remained un-
changed from the original Act until 1948 when the words "for
less than one year" were deleted. By the amendment of 1952200
the requirement that the employee sign the compensation book
was eliminated. Much of the case law prior to the 1952 amend-
ment concerned issues of fact as to whether or not the compen-
sation record had been signed.201
It has been held that where an employer had bound himself
by a collective bargaining agreement to comply with the provi-
sions of the workmen's compensation and occupational disease
laws, an employee was covered even though he had not ac-
cepted the provisions of KRS 342.005(2) [case arose under Act
prior to 1956 amendment].2°2
By the 1956 amendment language was added to this section to
conform it with the new Occupational Disease provisions. How-
ever, there was an additional significant change, namely, that the
employer's acceptance of the Act included all of the provisions
with respect to traumatic personal injury, silicosis and any other
occupational disease, which, of course, eliminates a joint volun-
tary acceptance as previously required for silicosis under
KRS 342.005(2) prior to its enactment in 1956. The joint-vol-
.99a Mahan v. Litton, 321 S.W. 2d 243 (Ky. 1959); Commonwealth of Ken-
tucky v. Meyers, 307 S.W. 2d 179 (Ky. 1957).
200 Held constitutional in Wells v. Jefferson County, 255 S.W. 2d 462 (Ky.
1953).2 01 For typical cases of this type see McNeese Construction Co. v. Harris, 273
S.W. 2d 355 (Ky. 1954); Garmeada Coal Co. v. Marsee, 300 Ky. 414, 189 S.W.
2d 399 (1945).
202 Dick v. International Harvester Co., 310 S.W. 2d 514 (Ky. 1958).
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untary-acceptance requirement still applies to employers and
employees excepted from the Act and employers with less than
three employees. 0 3
The burden of proof is upon the employee to show that he
was under the Act unless sufficient facts raise a presumption
of coverage that shifts the burden to the employer.04
As previously stated in our discussion of the constitutionality
of the Act, the Workmen's Compensation Act is voluntary as
far as the employer is concerned. 05
842.400 [4958] Notice of employe's rejection to be preserved. (1)
All notices of rejection of the provisions of this chapter by employes
shall, when executed, be preserved by the employer during the con-
tinuation of the employment of those employes whose names are
subscribed thereto.
(2) No person shall with fraudulent intent, willfully destroy,
convert or secrete any such notice, or willfully deprive the owner or
his agent thereof, or erase or obliterate any part thereof.
This section of the original Act remained relatively un-
changed until the amendment of 1954. It seems the Legislature
in eliminating the requirement of signing of the register by the
1952 amendment neglected to amend this section. This over-
sight was corrected in 1954 with the changing of the words "all
notice of election" to "all notices of rejection." The penalty for
violation of this section has remained unchanged since the
original Act.2'0 The case law previously arising under the neces-
sity of keeping the written election is, of course, equally ap-
plicable to keeping a notice of rejection.' 7
842.405 [4959] Withdrawal from election to operate or rejection of
chapter; filing; effect; posted notice. At any time after electing to
operate under this chapter, an employer may withdraw such elec-
tion by filing written notice with the board stating the date when
such withdrawal is effective, and the industry, business or operation
203 KRS 42.005(2).
204Walker v. Lebanon Stone Co., 312 Ky. 624, 229 S.W. 2d 163 (1950);
also see Dick v. International Harvester Co., 310 S.W. 2d 514 (Ky. 1958).
205 Greene v. Caldwell, 186 S.W. 648 (Ky. 1916); GritGn v. Cornett-Lewis
Coal Co., 280 Ky. 116, 132 S.W. 2d 781 (1939).
206 KRS 342.990(3).
207 Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Sizemore, 254 Ky. 102, 71 S.W. 2d 11 (1934);
MeCune v. Win. B. Pell & Bros., 192 Ky. 22, 232 S.W. 43 (1921).
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covered thereby, and by personal written notice to the employe, or
posting in conspicuous places about such place of business not less
than one week next preceding the date on which the withdrawal is
to become effective copies of the notice. An employe who has re-
jected the provisions of this chapter may withdraw his rejection by
filing with the employer a written notice of withdrawal, stating the
date when the withdrawal is to become effective. Following the
filing or giving of such notices, the status of the party withdrawing
shall become the same as if his former election or rejection had not
been made, except that withdrawal of election by employer shall
not be effective as to any injury sustained less than one week after
the notice is filed. An employer, while operating under this chapter,
shall at all times keep posted in conspicuous places about his place
of business notices to that effect, in the form prescribed by the board.
This section of the original Act remained relatively un-
changed until the amendment of 1954 (as with KRS 342.400).
It seems the Legislature when it eliminated the requirement of
signing the register by the 1952 amendment neglected to amend
this section. This oversight was corrected in 1954 with the
changing of the words "elected" to "rejected" in their appropri-
ate places in this section.
Where a claim at law is grounded upon the failure of the
defendant employer to comply with the provisions of this sec-
tion, the plaintiff has to expressly allege such failure in his
petition.
20 8
For a thorough discussion of the practical operation of this
section see Harvey Coal Corp. v. Morris, 314 Ky. 71, 237 S.W.
2d 70 (1951).
842.410 [4960] Employer who fails to elect denied certain de-
fenses at law. Every employer affected by this chapter who does not
elect to operate under this chapter shall not, in any suit at law by
an employe or his representative to recover damages for personal
injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment, be permitted to defend any such suit at law upon any
or all of the following grounds:
(1) That the employe was guilty of contributory negligence.
(2) That the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow
servant of the injured employe.
(3) That the employe has assumed the risk of injury.
208 Wilson v. Williams Coal Co., 307 Ky. 842, 212 S.W. 2d 318 (1948).
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This section has remained unchanged since the original Act.
Even though the employer cannot rely upon the defenses of as-
sumed risk and contributory negligence (and fellow servant
doctrine) when he has not elected to operate under the provi-
sions of the Act, it is still incumbent upon the employee to
prove that actionable negligence on the part of the employer
was the proximate cause of the injury.
20 9
In a common law action by an employee to recover for injuries
against an employer not operating under the Act, it was error to
instruct the jury (although not prejudicial in this case for other
reasons) that the employee had a duty to exercise ordinary care
for his own safety, since contributory negligence is not available
as a defense.210
342.415 [4961] Employe who rejects provisions of chapter is sub-
ject to common law defenses. Every employe affected by this chap-
ter who rejects the provisions herein, and his representative in case
of death, shall, in any suit at law against an employer electing to
operate under this chapter to recover damage for personal injury or
death by accident arising out of and in the course of his employ-
ment, proceed at law as if this chapter did not exist, and the em-
ployer may avail himself of the defenses of contributory negligence,
negligence of a fellow servant and assumption of risk as such de-
fenses exist at common law.
211
This section remained unchanged from the original Act
until the amendment of 1954. It seems the Legislature when it
eliminated the requirement of signing the register by the 1952
amendment neglected to amend this section. This oversight was
corrected in 1954 with the changing of the words "elected" to
"rejected" in their appropriate places in this section.
342.420 [4962] Employe not to pay premium for compensation.
No agreement by any employe to pay any portion of the insurance
premium paid by his employer shall be valid. No employer shall
209Engle Coal Co. v. Drake, 311 S.W. 2d 563 (Ky. 1958) and cases cited
therein; also see Burk Hollow Coal Co. v. Bills, 300 Ky. 735, 190 S.W. 2d 338
(1945); Harlan Central Coal Co. v. Gimmo's Adm'r., 296 Ky. 828, 178 S.W. 2C]
217 (1944).
210 Croley v. Huddleston, 301 Ky. 580, 192 S.W. 2d 717 (1946).
211 Consolidated Realty Company v. Jones, 219 Ky. 647, 294 S.W. 172
(1927).
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deduct any portion of such premium from the wages or salary of
any employe entitled to the benefits of this chapter.
This section has remained unchanged from the original Act
of 1916, as has the penalty for violation of the section. 12
342.425 [4963] Attorneys required to represent board. Upon the
request of the board, the Attorney-General, or, under his direction, the
Commonwealth's attorney or county attorney of any county, shall
institute and prosecute the necessary actions or proceedings for the
enforcement of any of the provisions of this chapter arising within
his jurisdiction, and shall defend in like manner all actions or pro-
ceedings brought against the board or the members thereof in their
official capacity.
This section has remained unchanged from the original Act of
1916.
342.430 [4964] Blank forms to be furnished by board. The board
shall prepare and furnish, free of charge, blank forms of all notices,
claims, reports, proofs and other blank forms and literature which
it considers proper and requisite to the efficient administration of
this chapter. It may authorize the publication and distribution of
such blanks by employers and their insurers in manner and form
provided by it, and shall make rules for their distribution so that
they may be readily available. 213
This section has remained substantially unchanged since the
1916 Act.
342.435 [4965] Board's annual report. Annually on or before the
15th day of December the board shall make a report to the Gov-
ernor for the preceding fiscal year, which shall include a statement
of the number of awards made and of claims rejected by it, a gen-
eral statement of the causes of accident leading to the injuries for
which awards were made or rejected claims based, and a detailed
statement of the disbursements from and unpaid expenses charge-
able against the maintenance fund and its condition, together with
any other information which the board deems proper to call to the
attention of the Governor, including any recommendations it may have
212 KRS 342.990(4).
2
13 All forms are available by writing directly to the Board at Frankfort,
Kentucky.
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to make, and it shall be the duty of the board to publish and dis-
tribute among employers and employes such general information as
to the business transacted by the department as may be useful and
necessary. The annual report shall not exceed ten thousand copies.
All printing of the department 'shall be done by the contractor or
contractors for public printing, subject to such provisions of the gen-
eral laws governing public printing as may be applicable thereto.
This section remained substantially unchanged until 1944
when the number of copies of the annual report was raised from
500 to 10,000 and a provision concerning the abuse of the right
to publish information was deleted.
842.440 [4968] Fund for administration. For the purpose of paying
the salaries and necessary expenses of the board and its assistants
and employes in administering and carrying out this chapter an ad-
ministrative fund shall be created and maintained in the manner
provided in KRS 342.450 to 42.485.
The general principle for the maintenance of the Fund for ad-
ministration has remained generally the same as provided in the
1916 Act. There has, of course, been changes in the amounts of
monies involved and the amount of tax.
KRS 342.445-KRS 342.475 relate to the subject matter of in-
surance, which as indicated supra, is not directly germaine to
the discussion here.
KRS 842.480-342.490 pertain to the maintenance fund, sur-
plus and appropriations and limitations of expenses or indebted-
ness to be incurred by the Board, none of which is within the
scope of this discussion. KRS -42.495-842.545 deal with the
Kentcuky Employes' Insurance Association and are not germaine
to the discussion.
342.990 [4944; 4945; 4958; 4962; 4968-5] Penalties. (1) Any em-
ployer subject to this chapter who refuses or willfully neglects to
make the report required by KRS 342.330 shall be fined not more
than twenty-five dollars for each offense.
(2)Any person who violates KRS 342.335 shall be fined not less
than fifty dollars nor more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned
for not less than ten nor more than ninety days.
(3) Any person who violates subsection (2) of KRS 342.400 shall
be fined not less than fifty dollars nor more than two hundred dol-
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lars or imprisoned for not less than ten nor more than ninety days.
(4) Any employer who violates KRS 342.420 shall be fined not
more than one hundred dollars for each offense.
(5) Any person who violates any of the provisions of KIRS 342.445
to 342.475 shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor more
than one thousand dollars or imprisoned for not less than ten nor
more than ninety days, or both.
(8) Any employer who shall willfully violate any provision of
KRS 342.016 or 342.017 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon
conviction shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor more
than five hundred dollars, and each day's operation in violation of
KRS 342.016 or 342.017 shall constitute a separate offense, and such
employer shall be enjoined from continuing such violations at the
suit of the Attorney-General in an action instituted by him in the
Franklin Circuit Court, on which jurisdiction to try such action is
hereby conferred.
The penalties provided for in the original Act were listed in
the respective sections to which the penalty was applicable.
Sometime prior to 1944 these penalties were set out in what is
now the present KRS 342.990.
By amendment in 1946 penalties for violations of subsec-
tions (2) and (3) of KRS 342.005, subsection (1) of KRS
342.340, and KRS 342.007 were provided. However, since it was
held214 that these sections were impliedly repealed by a later
amendment, the penalties set out in subsections (6) and (7)
of this section were also repealed.
Subsection (8) of this section was also enacted in 1946 and
still is in effect.
Conclusion
Even with the numerous amendments heretofore set out, it
is submitted that the reader will agree that the overall approach
to compensation recovery in Kentucky has remained unchanged
from the original Act. This accomplishment inures to the credit
of the Commission who formulated the original Act.215
214 Sumpter v. Burchett, 304 Ky. 858, 202 S.W. 2d 735 (1947).
215 A movement originated in the Attorney General's Department for the
purpose of forming a non-partisan investigating commission including representa-
tives of employers and employees for the purpose of creating some type of Act
which would be mutually acceptable to each group. The following persons were
appointed by their respective organizations as members of the commission: By
the Kentucky State Federation of Labor, H. J. Allington, Otto Wolff, John
Schneider and Peter Campbell; by the Kentucky Manufacturers' and Shippers
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Most of the amendments to the Act have been by agreement
between the representatives of employer groups and represen-
tatives of labor groups. Without an "agreed bill" chances for
passage of proposed amendments have been extremely limited.21
What future course the Act will take is without the purview
of this article. However, a general observation of the trend in
workmen's compensation laws in other states indicates that the
greatest void now existing in the Kentucky Act lies in the field
of rehabilitation. Although the General Assembly enacted the
Industrial Rehabilitation Act in 1922,217 the Act was subsequently
repealed in 1940.
APPENDIX I
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN TRIAL OF
COMPENSATION CASES ADOPTED BY WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION BOARD, STATE OF KENTUCKY, PURSUANT TO
KRS 342.260, EFFECTIVE AS REGULATIONS UNDER CHAPTER
13 OF THE KENTUCKY REVISED STATUTES ON OCTOBER
15, 1956 AND KNOWN AS WCB-1 THROUGH WCB-25, EXCEPT
THAT WCB-23 WAS EFFECTIVE APRIL 3, 1957; WCB-18 WAS
AMENDED EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 5, 1957, AND WCB-24 DOES
NOT PERTAIN TO TRIALS AND WAS EFFECTIVE OCTOBER
23, 1957.
RULES OF PROCEDURE INDEX
Additional Pleadings or Briefs-WCB ................................. 18
Answer-Special-When Necessary ...................................... 4
Appearance-Exception .......................................................... 7
Attorney Fee ......................................................................... 20
Briefs on Full Board Review ................................................. 17
Cases-When and How Submitted ....................................... 14
Continuances ............................................................................ 6
D efendants ............................................................................... 3
Depositions and Discovery ........................................ 12, 23, 25
Evidence-How Introduced-Depositions ................ 9, 10, 12
Assn., Philip S. Tuley, Alfred Struck and W. Pratt Dale; by the Kentucky Mine
Owners' Association, Kenneth U. Meguire and Charles W. Taylor; by the At-
torney General, Robert T. Caldwell. The Committee was assisted by Nicholas
H. Dosker of Louisville, the author of the First Edition of the excellent treatise
so frequently referred to in this discussion. See Dosker, Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law of Kentucky 780-53 (1916).
21No agreed bill was forthcoming in 1958 and no amendments were enacted
into the Act during the 1958 session of the Assembly.217 Dosker, Workmen's Compensation Law of Kentucky 784-85 (1916). 784.
1959]
860 KENTuCKY LAw JouRNAL [Vol. 47,
Extensions ............................................................................ 6, 12
Full Board Hearing ................................................................ 16
H earings ................................................................................. 10
Oral Arguments-Statement to Obtain .............................. 21
Order of Testimony Introduced ...................................... 10, 11
Original Application-Subsequent Pleadings ...................... I
Party's Failure to Appear at Hearing .................................. 13
Payment of Compensation .................................................. 19
Place of H earings .................................................................... 5
Plaintiffs ................................................................................... 2
Records Not to be Withdrawn ........................................... 22
Self Insurers-Rules For ........................................................ 24
Stipulation of Facts .................................................................. 8
Subsequent Proceedings to be on Original Cause ........... 15
1. Original Application-Subsequent Pleadings
a. All applications, pleadings, motions, special answers and
papers must be printed or typewritten in the form prescribed by the
Board.
b. The original application, or petition, shall be filed in trip-
licate.
c. All pleadings and papers led subsequent to the original
application or petition shall certify that a copy was sent to all parties
of record; anly the original thereof shall be filed with the Board.
2. Plaintiffs
a. All persons should be joined as plaintiffs in whom any right
to any relief, arising out of the same transaction, is alleged to exist.
b. If any such person, should refuse to join as plaintiff, he
should then be joined as a defendant, and the fact of his refusal to
join as a plaintiff should be stated in the application, petition or
complaint.
c. The parties to any original proceedings before the Board
shall be designated as the plaintiff and the defendant. Party filing the
application, petition or complaint in such proceedings shall be desig-
nated as the plaintiff and the adverse party as the defendant.
8. Defendants
All persons should be joined as defendants against whom the
right to any relief is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or
in the alternative, and the Board at any time, upon a proper showing,
or of its own motion, may order that any additional party be joined,
when it deems the presence of such party necessary.
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4. Answer-Special-When Necessary
a. The Defendant may file an answer to or denial of the ap-
plication of the Plaintiff at least five days before the date set for the
hearing, but no such answer is required, and, if none is fied, the
allegations contained in the application will be deemed to be denied.
b. If the defendant relies upon an affirmative special defense,
he shall set forth such defense in a special answer to be filed at least
five days before the date set for hearing or within five days after such
defense is discovered or could have been discovered in the exercise of
due diligence. If, in the exercise of due diligence, such defense could
not have been discovered until introduction of proof, such plea must
be filed to conform to the proof within five days thereafter.
5. Place of Hearings
Hearings of compensation claims shall be assigned in the county
where the accident or exposure occurred and can only be heard in
another county by agreement of the parties and authorization of the
Board.
6. Continuances
The policy of the Board will be to determine all questions brought
before it as speedily as possible, but the continuances of hearings and
extensions of time for good cause, properly shown, may be granted
upon the request of either party. Upon proper motion and notice the
Executive Secretary is authorized to enter orders granting continu-
ances up to fifteen days without approval of the Board.
7. Appearance-Exception
a. The parties to any proceedings before the Board may ap-
pear either in person or by an attorney.
b. Upon application, the Secretary will furnish to either party
the necessary blank forms for the prosecution or defense of any cause
before the Board.
c. An exception will always be given and entered of record in
favor of the party against whom a ruling is made, unless such party
has defaulted.
8. Stipulation of Facts
a. The parties to any proceeding before the Board may stipu-
late the facts in writing, and thereupon the Board will make its order
or award. Where all the material facts set out in the application for
hearing are admitted to be true by defendant, it may be so stipulated.
b. To the end that proceedings may be disposed of expedi-
tiously and with the least possible expense to the parties and the
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Commonwealth, representatives of the Board shall encourage the
parties to thus stipulate the facts whenever it can be done.
9. Evidence-How Introduced-Depositions
At all hearings evidence may be introduced by oral testimony
or by depositions as set forth herein.
10. Hearings
a. Every hearing upon a claim, held before the Board or one
of its representatives, shall be conducted in a summary manner.
Opportunity will be given to the parties at issue to introduce wit-
nesses and to present either in person or by counsel, the points at
issue. Such rearings shall be conducted in such manner as to ascer-
tain the substantial rights of the parties and to determine fairly and
expeditiously the controversy.
b. Claims shall stand for hearing before a Referee, a Member
of the Board or the Executive Secretary twenty days after an ap-
plication for adjustment is filed and at which hearing the Plaintiff
shall complete proof as far as possible but shall, upon request, be
granted thirty days thereafter in which to conclude proof in chief
by depositions, and at which time Plaintiff's taking of proof will stand
closed whether so announced or not. The claim shall again be re-
ferred for hearing at the expiration of Plaintiffs time upon request of
Defendant. If no such request is made prior to expiration of Plain-
tiff's time Defendant shall have thirty days thereafter to take proof
by depositions, at which time defendant's taking of proof shall stand
closed, whether so announced or not. Plaintiff shall have five days
thereafter to take depositions in rebuttal, and at which time the case
will stand submitted for decision. Extensions of time to take proof
will not be granted except for good cause shown. At the end of each
hearing or taking of depositions, the Referee, when present, shall
ask the parties whether there will be any further proof. If both parties
announce that all proof has been taken, the time for filing briefs
shall then be set by the Referee.
11. Order of Testimony Introduced
Plaintiff may be required to complete his testimony in court
and so announce before defendant shall be required to introduce
testimony.
12. Depositions and Discovery
Parties to a compensation claim can take depositions in accord-
ance with the provisions of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, being Rules 26 through 37.06, inclusive, except Rules 27,
[Vol. 47,
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88 and 86, which are not adopted by the Board and which shall not
apply to practice before the Board.
13. Party's Failure to Appear at Hearing
a. Where claimant fails to appear at the hearing of his case,
and no good cause is cited for his failure to appear, the case may be
ordered dismissed for lack of prosecution by the Board, with or
without prejudice.
b. Where the defendant fails to appear at the hearing of a case
and no good cause is presented for his failure to appear, the Ref-
eree shall proceed with the hearing of the case and it shall there-
after be submitted in accordance with these rules.
14. Cases-When and How Submitted
Cases shall be submitted on order of Executive Secretary, and
he is authorized to so enter said submission on the Board's order
book. Notice of submission shall be mailed to all interested parties.
15. Subsequent Proceedings to be on Original Cause
All applications or petitions for review or modification of any
award or order of the Board shall be styled with the name of the
parties, plaintiff and defendant, as in the proceedings in which the
award or order was made, shall bear the number of the original
proceedings and shall be filed therein.
16. Full Board Hearing
a. Upon a motion for full Board review the party filing appli-
cation for said review shall file a brief in support of his motion within
ten days from the filing of his motion whether or not a motion for
oral argument has been made. A copy of the brief filed shall be
furnished the opposing counsel who shall have twenty days from
the date of the notice of motion for review in which to file a brief.
b. Upon the lapsing of the time period for filing briefs, or the
receipt of briefs from all parties, whichever is sooner, the case shall
stand submitted for full Board review for initial determination.
17. Briefs on Full Board Review
Five copies of all briefs to the full Board, if a full Board re-
view is asked, shall be filed with the Board.
18. Additional Pleadings or Briefs
After a case has been submitted for full Board review no addi-
tional pleadings or briefs shall be filed. After the time for filing briefs
has expired no briefs will be accepted by the Board. Any of said
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briefs sent to the Board or any member thereof, shall be returned
to the sender, unless the Board by order directs otherwise.
19. Payment of Compensation
Compensation shall be paid direct to the parties entitled to re-
ceive the same and not to their attorneys. This shall not preclude put-
ting the Attorney's name on the compensation checks.
20. Attoiney Fee
The Board upon motion of an Attorney shall allow a reasonable
fee for services rendered in representing the plaintiff and under the
Act may order the payment of said allowance paid direct to such At-
torney, commuting sufficient .of the final payments of compensation
payable under the award to a lump sum for that purpose.
21. Oral Arguments-Statement to Obtain
The Board may at its discretion allow oral arguments upon
motion to full Board, where the Board deems it advisable to do so in
all claims involving questions of law, or where question of fact only
is involved and the amount of the award is in excess of $3,000.00.
An attorney desiring an oral argument shall file a motion with the
Board together with a statement showing the legal questions in-
volved, accompanied by a brief, and if an oral argument is granted
at least three members of the Board shall hear same at a time and
place designated by the Board.
22. Records Not to be 'Withdrawn
No record filed with this department is subject to withdrawal
by any person, except on order of the Board.
23. Depositions-Time for Filing
No deposition shall be considered, unless, within ten days after
submission, it has been filed with the Board; provided, however, that
the Board may for good cause shown and upon motion fied within
said ten days, grant such extension as it deems fit.
24. Rules for Self-Insurer Applicants
(This regulation is several pages in length and is therefore not
reproduced here. WCB-24 does not pertain to trial of compensation
cases. Employers desiring certificates under the provisions of KRS
342.345 may obtain copies of this regulation from the Board upon
request and without charge. Applicants should also note the Board's
Explanation of Board Forms found on pages 8-10 of this pamphlet.)
[Vol. 47,
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15. Subsequent Injury Medical Panels-Depositions Of
A medical panel appointed by the Board under KRS 841.121
cannot be examined by deposition on its report, except by special
permission granted by the Board on a proper motion made.
(WCB-25 was filed with the Legislative Research Commission
on October 22, 1958, to become effective on November 21, 1958).
